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PREFACE 
This study attempts to determine the legislative 
and judicial protection afforded local school districts 
against a reduction of state aid funds as a consequence 
of receiving federal revenue sharing funds. While no 
special revenue sharing for education programs has yet 
been enacted by the United States Congress, such a program 
has been before the Congress since 1971. It can be anti-
cipated that the concept of revenue sharing shall be an 
important aspect of public finance in the United States 
in the future, and this study is directed to some of the 
potential results of the concept being employed in financ-
ing public education. 
I wish to express my appreciation to my adviser, Dr. 
Lloyd L. Garrison, Head of the Department of Administra-
tive Services and Business Education, and to the other 
members of my advisory committee, Dr. Carl R. Anderson, 
Dr. Joe W. Fowler, and Dr. Herbert M. Jelley, for the op-
portunity to conduct a study somewhat different from 
those usually undertaken in the Department. They have 
afforded me a unique chance to combine past educational 
and professional experience with the field of business 
education. 
iii 
Hopefully, this study will serve as a word of en-
couragement to my brother, Jim. Preparation for the legal 
profession is long and arduous, but the many and varied 
opportunities presented to the successful candidate make 
the effort required for entry worthwhile, which, perhaps, 
this study, in some way, demonstrates. 
Finally, special gratitude is expressed to my wife, 
Marilyn, who, while engaged in her own academic endeavors, 
has consistently provided encouragement and understanding 
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The year 1972 long will be remembered as the year in 
which bold experimentation was undertaken in the area of 
governmental finance. That year saw the initial sharing 
of federal revenue directly with the states and local 
governments. 1 
The mechanics of revenue sharing are relatively easy 
to describe. Under the federal legislation, funds cur-
rently are being provided to state governments by the fed-
1 • 11 II • h • • 112 era government v1rtua y wit no restr1ct1ons. 
Congress only prohibits revenue sharing funds from being 
used as a state's contribution where other federal pro-
"d f d h" b · 3 grams prov1 e un son a mate 1ng as1s. 
Local governments as well are receiving federal reve-
nue sharing funds, and Congress has directed that they be 
used only for priority items, including public safety and 
transportation, environmental protection, health, recrea-
tion, libraries, social services, and financial administra-
tion.4 While at the present time the list is rather 
all-inclusive from the _standpoint of the services 
1 
2 
traditionally provided by local governments in the United 
States, 5 the existence of restrictions on the use of reve-
nue sharing funds by such governmental units makes this 
! 
facet of the program significantly different from that in-
volving state participation in reyenue sharing. 
As enacted in 1972, federal sharing of revenue with 
these two types of governmental bodies is to exist for at 
1 f . 6 east 1ve years. The significance of revenue sharing 
for, purposes of this study, however, is the potential role 
it has in financing public education. Currently, local ad 
valorem property taxes play a large role in such funding 
. t t H . . 7 in every s a e except awa11. President Richard M. Nixon, 
and others, however, have criticized the inequities in the 
property tax method of school financing, 8 and the federal 
administration has proposed taking the pressure off the 
h h h . 9 states t roug revenues ar1ng. 
A federal program of special revenue sharing to aid 
the educational efforts of states and local educational 
agencies is currently before the United States Congress. 
The Better Schools Act of 1973, supported by President 
Nixon, has been introduced in the Senate by Senator P. 
Dominick (R-Colo.), 10 and in the House of Representatives 
11 by Congressman A. Bell (R-Cal.). The major purpose of 
the Act is to repeal a number of existing federal educa-
tional assistance programs and to replace them with spe-
. 1 h . 12 c1a revenues ar1ng. 
3 
I . 
Statement of the Problem 
Education funds provided by local _ad valorem property 
taxes and by certain federal programs traditionally are 
supplemented by aid from state governments to local school 
districts. The major problem to which this study addressed 
itself was to determine the sources and dugrees of protec-
tion (if any) that are afforded local educational agencies 
from having state aid reduced as a consequence of those 
agencies receiving federal revenue sharing funds. The 
current methods of calculation of the amount of state aid 
vary from state to state, 13 and no value judgments were 
made concerning each state's respective plan. Rather, the 
study sought to determine whether and to what extent a 
state plan for providing aid to local educational agencies 
can take into consideration federal aid funds provided to 
local agencies through revenue sharing. 
Within the framework of the above described general 
purpose of this study, three major objectives can be iden-
tified. They are 
1) to gather in one document representations 
of the rationale of every American appellate court 
opinion which has decided issues relating to reduc-
tions in state aid to local school districts as a 
consequence of those districts receiving federal 
funds; 
4 
2) to provide state and local school admini-
strators and other interested individuals an analysis 
of the potential consequences of alternative con-
gressional statutory formulations in federal revenue 
sharing for education; and 
3) to analyze federal revenue sharing for 
education proposals currently before the Congress, 
so that, should circumstances warrant, state and 
local school administrators may be able to respond 
effectively to those proposals to the maximum bene-
fit of their students and districts. 
Procedure 
Since the major portion of this study required the 
analysis of cases from various jurisdictions dealing with 
the same point of law, extensive use was made of the Key 
Number System of Classification of the American Digest 
System, published by West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 
Minnesota. The West Key Number classification system pro-
vides a topical listing of subject matter, with a short 
analysis, usually no longer than a brief paragraph, of 
each reported appellate case dealing with a particular 
subject. 14 
The American Digest, comprised of the Century Digest, 
the Decennial Digests, and the General Digest, is the mas-
ter index to all of the case law of the United States. It 
provides the citation for every case relevant to the topic 
5 
under consideration in this. study from 1658 to the present 
day. The Century Digest cites those cases decided from 
1658 through ~8~6, while the First Decennial Digest through 
the Seventh Decennial Digest cover ten-year periods from 
1897 through 1966. The G~neral Digest, Fourth Series, 
currently in 29 volumes, cites cases from 1966 through the 
current year. 
Of the seven Main Divisions of the West Key Number 
classification system, number seven is "Government." Un-
der this heading are six Subheadings, the third of which 
is "Legislative and Executive Powers and Functions." Of 
the 18 Digest Topics under this Subheading, the fourteenth 
is "Schools and School Districts." Section II under the 
fourteenth Subheading is entitled "Public Schools," while 
subsection A under section II is "Establishment, School 
Lands and Funds, and Regulations in General.'' Key Number 
19 under the Digest Topic "Schools and School Districts" 
is entitled "Apportionment and disposition," with 19 (1) 
being headed "In general." All of the cases which have 
dealt with the issue under consideration should appear un-
der this Topic and Key Number, "Schools and School Dis-
tricts, 19 (l). 1115 
Each relevant case cited by this system, from the 
earliest reported through the latest, was analyzed to de-
termine the role of the federal and state statutory lan-
guage in affording protection (if any) to local educational 
agencies against a reduction of state aid funds as a 
6 
consequence of those agencies re~eiving federal assistance, 
and is included in this study. Ea~h case cited as authori-
ty for its position on the issue ,of this study by a court 
referred to under the appropriate Topic and Key Number was 
read by the investigator, and, where such a cited case con-
tributes to a resolution of the problem herein considered, 
an analysis of that cited case also is included in this 
study. Where either a principal case included under the 
appropriate Topic and Key Number or a case cited (as des-
cribed above) by a principal case had been cited as 
authority in a subsequent decision dealing with the issue 
of this study, the subsequent decision was read by the in-
vestigator, and, where such a subsequent decision contri-
buted to a resolution of the problem of this thesis, an 
analysis of that subsequent case also is included. 
These case analyses are grouped according to signifi-
cant similarities in the federal assistance being provided 
in each instance. In the initial series of cases, re-
sources were provided to the inhabitants of local geo-
graphic areas for the use and support of their schools. 
The second group of cases dealt with instances in which 
federal funds were given to states for the benefit of 
designated schools therein. The final line of decisions 
involved federal payments directly to local educational 
agencies to assist those agencies in meeting their respon-
sibilities. Within each such grouping the analyses of the 
individual cases are presented in chronological order, 
from the earliest to the latest. Special emphasis was 
given to four possible controlling influences in the re-
solution of the issues presented by the cases: 
1) the expressed intent of Congress; 
2) the form of the federal assistance; 
3) the payee of the federal assistance; 
4) the source of the controlling law. 
7 
The cases relevant to this study have interpreted and 
analyzed specific pieces of federal legislation providing 
resources to local educational efforts in determining the 
expressed intent of Congress, the form and the payee of 
the federal assistance, and the source of,the controlling 
law. It was necessary, therefore, to review in some de-
tail the language of the federal statutory provisions of 
importance to these cases in order to recognize the bases 
of the courts' decisions, and to project the significance 
of these decisions to the issue of whether and to what ex-
tent protection is afforded local school districts against 
a reduction of state aid funds as a consequence of receiv-
ing federal revenue sharing funds. The analyses of past 
and current federal legislative enactments precedes the 
analyses of the cases in which the respective statutes 
were construed. 
Finally, federal revenue sharing for education propo-
sals currently before the Congress was analyzed to deter-
mine where they fall within the framework of congressional 
legislation, court decisions, and the protection afforded 
8 
local school districts. This study presented some indica-
tion of the local school districts' vulnerability to state 
reduction of state aid funds-under the revenue sharing for 
education proposals before Congress. It is further anti-
cipated that this study will help federal, state, and lo-
cal legislative and administrative officials.become aware 
of the critical importance of the specific language em-
ployed in any federal revenue sharing for education stat-
ute ultimately adopted by the Congress so that the effort 
to provide for effective and efficient use of resources in 
education may be advanced. 
Specifically, the cases relevant to the topic of this 
study may be divided into three groups: those involving 
federal grants to inhabitants of townships for the use and 
support of their schools, those involving federal grants 
to states for the benefit of specified schools, and those 
involving federal payments to local educational agencies 
to assist them in carrying out their educational missions. 
The particular legislation enacted by Congress is presented 
first for each of these three groupings, and is followed 
immediately by an extensive examination of courts' respon-
ses under the respective statutes to reductions in state 
aid to local educational agencies as a consequence of re-
ceiving federal funds. Then, a brief history of federal 
revenue sharing for education proposals is presented, fol-
lowed by an examination of the declaration of congressional 
intent and the designation of the forili and the payees of 
9 
the federal funds of revenue sharing for education propo-
sals currently before the United States Congress. The 
protection afforded local educational agencies against a 
reduction in state aid funds as a consequence of receiving 
federal revenue sharing funds under the current proposals 
is determined using past legislation and litigation as 
authority and precedent, and the study concludes with a 
statement summarizing the findings made and suggesting the 
conclusions to be drawn. 
FOOTNOTES. 
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8see Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School 
Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280 (W.D.Tex. 1971), hev'd, 93 S.Ct. 
1278 (1973). 
9Tulsa Daily World, March 22, 1973, § A, 1, col. 1. 
10 S. 1319, 93dCong., lstSess. (1973). 
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1411The great practical value of the Key Number System 
to the profession lies in the fact that a lawyer, once 
having located the Topic and Key Number, has ready access 
to all American cases that have litigated his question . 
. . . The advantage of the system is that he can mechani-
cally extend his search to: ... (4) all American cases 
from 1658 to the present date by examining the same Topic 
and Key Number in the American Digest." West'~ Law Finder 
17-18 (1967). 
1511Every time a case is decided on a certain point of 
law, the digest paragraph dealing with that point is placed 
in the box assigned to that point of law. Therefore, 
10 
11 
every box will have in it digest paragraphs from all cases 
that have dealt with its assigned point of law." West's 
Law Finder 17 (1967). -- -
CHAPTER II 
THE CONGRESSIONAL TOWNSHIP GRANTS 
AND LITIGATION 
The Creation of the Congressional 
Township Funds 
Later to become the subject of extensive litigation, 
the first effort on the part of Congress to provide re-
sources to aid local educational efforts was made in the 
early part of the nineteenth century. Recognizing the 
weakness of the then popular metes and bounds and monu-
ments methods of real property description, the federal 
government adopted the rectangular survey April 26, 1785. 1 
This system, based on meridians, or surveying lines run-
ning north and south, and base lines, or surveying lines 
running east and west, divided the area surveyed into 
quadrangles, twenty-four miles square. These quadrangles 
were subdivided into sixteen areas called townships, each 
measuring six miles square, or thirty-six square miles. 
Finally, these townships were again subdivided into thirty-
six one mile square sections. 
The sections in each township were numbered in a uni-




mile) in the northeast corijir lof the township (measuring 
six miles by six miles) being designa·ted number "one." 
The section west of section "one" was designated "two," 
and so through section "six." The section south of sec-
tion "six" was numbered "seven," while the section east of 
section "seven" was numbered "eight," and so through sec-
tion "twelve." The section south of sect1,.on "twelve" was 
designated number "thirteen," and a similar pattern of 
numbering first six sections west and then six sections 
east was followed until all 36 sections of the township 
had been numbered. 2 
On May 20, 1785, a federal ordinance "to ascertain 
the mode of disposing of lands in the western territory" 
provided that "there should be reserved the lot number 
sixteen of every township, for the maintenance of public 
schools within the said township. 113 Further, the act of 
March 26, 1804, which provided for the disposal of the 
public lands in the Indiana territory, stated, "the sec-
tion 'number sixteen' ... shall be reserved in each 
township for the support of schools within the same. 114 
While both of these provisions ~e~e~ved lands for public 
education, it was not until 1816 that the beneficial in-
terest in the lands was divested by the federal govern-
ment. 
The people of Indiana were authorized, on April 19, 
1816, to form a state government and secure admission to 
the Union. 5 By section six of the enabling act, Congress 
14 
offered the convention of the territory of Indiana certain 
propositions, including, 6 
Fin~~- That the section numbered sixteen, 
in every township, and when such section has 
been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands, 
equivalent thereto, and most contiguous to the 
same, shall be granted to, the inhabitants of 
such township for the use of schools. 
This offer was accepted by the Indiana State Constitution-
al Convention, June 29, 1816, in its Acceptance of the 
7 Congressional Enabling Act. 
In 1828, Congress authorized the sale of the lands 
that had been reserved for public schools and granted to 
the inhabitants of the congressional townships. 8 The 
legislature of the State of Indiana was empowered to sell 
and convey such lands, and to invest the proceeds of the 
sale, which proceeds were to 9 
be forever applied, under the direction of said 
legislature, for the use and support of schools, 
within the several townships and districts of 
the country for which they were originally re-
served and set apart, and for no other use or 
purpose whatsoever .... 
The congressional intent expressed in these statutes 
is rather broad. The reservation in the ordinance of 
May 20, 1785, is "for the maintenance of public schools 
within the said township, 1110 where the section is located. 
The purpose of the reservation as expressed in the 1804 
act is "for the support of schools within the same. 1111 
The Indiana enabling act's grant not only named a purpose, 
but also included an indication of who the grantees were 
to be: "to the inhabitants of such township for the use 
15 
· 12 
of schools." Finally, the 18 28 f eder,al legislation pro-
vidipg for the sale of the lands reserved included the 
purpose to which the funds were to be applied: "for the 
use and support of schools, within the several townships 
and districts of the country for which they were origi-
nally set apart. 1113 
Clearly the inhabitants and their schools were the 
objects of the congressional generosity. Just as clearly, 
in each of these congressional enactments, Congress was 
attempting to aid educational funding by providing re-
sources directly to the local level. Each of the four 
statutes cited specifically mentioned the township, a geo-
graphical subdivision of the state, not the state itself, 
as the resting place for the aid provided. Indeed, in the 
Indiana enabling act, the grant is not even made to a lo-
cal educational agency within the current definition of 
that term. Rather, the grant is made to the inhabitants 
who would be served by such an agency. 
It should be noted also that the form of aid given in 
the first three statutes considered was land. The reser-
vations made in the 1785 and 1804 legislation dealt with 
sections, and the initial grant made in 1816 also was in 
the form of land. In 1828, however, the state was author-
ized to convert the land into other property through sale. 
All subsequent legislation with which this paper will deal 
provided assistance in the form of moneys. 
16 
The Congressional Township Fund 
Litigation 
Since the Indiana constitution of 1851 was considered, 
either directly or indirectly, in each of the five deci-
sions to be discussed in this section, it is appropriate 
to examine certain of its provisions at this point. Sec-
tion one, article eight of the Indiana constitution of 
1851 called for the state's general assembly 
to provide, by law, for a general and uniform 
system of common schools, wherein tuition shall 
be without charge, and equally open to all. 
The same article also provided, in the second section, 
"The common school fund shall consist of the congressional 
township fund, and the lands belonging thereto; [and other 
funds]," and, in the seventh section, 
All trust funds, held by the state, shall 
remain inviolate, and be faithfully and exclu-
sively applied to the purpose for which the 
trust was created. 
The Indiana school law of June 14, 1852, called for 
the consolidation in one general and common fund of all 
h 1 f d f h d . d 14 M common sc oo un s, rom w atever source er1ve. ore 
specifically, the act of 1852 provided15 
Sec.2. The funds heretofore known and 
designated as the congressional township fund, 
[and other funds] ... and all funds hereto-
fore appropriated to common schools, [and other 
funds] ... shall be denominated the common 
school fund, the income of which, together 
with [certain property taxes] shall be applied 
to the support of the common schools. 
The Indiana supreme court observed16 
In brief, the law diverts the proceeds of 
the sixteenth section from the use of schools 
in the congressional township where the land 
is situated, to the use of the school system 
of the state at large. 
State v. Springfield Township (1854) 
The complaint in State v. Sp~ingdield Town~hip 17 
17 
questioned the validity of the state statutory provision, 
which, if enforced, would have diverted the income of the 
Springfield township fund (the proceeds of the sale of the 
sixteenth section in Springfield township), amounting to 
7,423 dollars and 36 cents, from the use of the inhabi-
tants of Springfield to the support of schools elsewhere 
in Indiana. In addressing the issue, "Was it competent 
for the state so to divert the township fund?, 1118 the 
court concerned itself with "the purpose for which the 
19 congressional township fund was created," and held that 
the term "inhabitants" in the act of April 19, 1816, was 
f 1 . 20 a term o exc us1on. 
Those living beyond the limits of the township 
are excluded from sharing the income of the 
sixteenth section or its proceeds. The word 
inhabitant~, as there used, is of itself suf-
ficiently potent to confine the expenditure 
of the fund for the use of schools within and 
for the township. 
In relying on the federal statutory language of 1816 and 
21 1828, the court concluded 
The point of inquiry is the intention and pur-
pose of the grant .... [I]t is dedicated 
to a particular use, for the benefit of parti-
cular persons. That use is the schools of 
the township; and the persons to be benefited, 
the inhabitants of the township in which the 
lands are situated. 
18 
The court was not concerned that, notwithstanding the 
above conclusions concerning the grant, the act of May 24, 
1828, indicated that the proceeds were to be applied "un-
der the direction of said [Indiana] legislature. 1122 In 
treating the legislature as a trustee for purposes of the 
Indiana constitution, article eight, section seven, the 
court reasoned, 23 
The supervision exercised by the legis-
lature over the township fund is but an implied 
necessity sanctioned by congress. It extends 
only to protecting and administering, not di-
verting, the fund._ 
The court was thus able to conclude that the school 
law of 1852, by consolidating the congressional township 
fund with other state and local funds, did not "faithfully 
and exclusively apply that fund to the purposes for which 
it was created. 1124 The court held, 24 
The operation of the law is to distribute to 
the people of the state at large a school fund 
created for the exclusive use of the inhabitants 
of Springfield township. 
To that extent the law is in violation of 
the seventh section of article eight of the 
constitution, and therefore void. 
It is significant in this case that the court's pri-
mary concern was whether the consequences of the state 
statute were a violation of the state constitution. While 
it may have been easy to strike down under the supremacy 
clause of the United States Constitution the state funding 
scheme as violative of congressional intent in making the 
I . 
.congressional township fund grants, ·th~ Supreme Court of 
Indiana held that the state scheme must fall because it 
violated the Indiana constitution.· 
In the view of the instant court, the intent of 
19 
Congress as expressed in the federal statutes was secon-
dary in importance in this case to the intent of the peo-
ple of Indiana as expressed i~ their constitution. Thus, 
in this initial decision concerning federal aid to funding 
public education, the intent of Congress and the purpose 
of the congressional grants were significant only in as-
certaining whether the state was following the dictates of 
its own constitution. The law which controlled the out-
come of the case was found by the court to be in the Indi-
ana constitution, the wording of which was held to require 
the faithful and exclusive use of trust funds, of which, 
the court held, the congressional township funds were one 
example, to the purpose for which the trust was created. 
Quick v. White-Water Township (1856) 
The Indiana constitution again played a significant 
role in the second in the series of cases relating to the 
congressional township funds of the state. In Qulek v. 
I 
Whlte-Waten Town~hlp, 26 however, the focai point of judi-
cial consideration shifted from the seventh section of 
article eight to the first section of the same article, 
requiring the legislature 27 
t-0 provide, by law, for a general and uniform 
system of.c-ommon schools, wherein tuition shall 
be withorii charge, and ·equ~lly open to all. 
20 
While State v. Sp'1.ing6i~ld _Town-0hip 28 dealt with an at-
tempt to divert funds, granted by Congress to inhabitants 
of a geographic area within a state, i.e.; the township, 
away from those beneficiaries, Quick v. WhLte-Wa.t.e.'1. Town-
Jhip29 was concerned with the first reporied attempt by a 
state to reduce its aid commitment to a local educational 
agency because that agency had received funds from a fed-
eral source. That attempt was remarkably successful. 
It should be pointed out here that apparently no 
legal significance need be attached to the distinction 
between inhabitants and townships as recipients of the 
congressional township fund grants. While the latter may 
\ 
constitute local educational agencies, certainly the 
former do not. Nevertheless, the Indiana supreme court, 
in Stat~ v. Sp'1.ing 0ield Town-0hip~O as authority for re-
fusing to permit the state to divert the funds, quoted 
approvingly language of the United States Supreme Court. 31 
'The citizens within the township are the bene-
ficiaries of the charity. The title to these 
lands has never been considered in the state; 
and it has no inherent right to appropriate 
them to any purpose other than for the bene-
fit of schools. For the exercise of the chari-
ty under the laws, the title is in the town-
ship.' Vineenne-0 Unive.'1.Ji.t.y v. Indiana, 
14 How. 268. 
Therefore, there is considerable sanction, in both the 
United States Supreme Court and the Indiana supreme court, 
for treating the grant to the inhabitants as a grant to 
/ 
a local educational agency, in this instance, the town-
ship. 
The Indiana school law enacted March 5, 1855, re-
quired the state superintendent of public instruction 
annually to distribute the amount of the income of the 
21 
common school fund in each county and the amount of taxes 
collected for school purposes to the state's several coun-
ties according t~ the number of students therein, without 
32 considering the congressional township fund. After re-
ceiving the county's distribution from the state, the 
county treasurer of each county was directed to distribute 
the income to which his county was so entitled to the sev-
eral townships and incorporated cities and towns of his 
33 county. The county treasurer, however, was directed to 
ascertain the amount of the congressional township fund 
belonging to each city, town, and township, and to appor-
tion the income of the common school fund as to equalize 
the per student amount available in each city, town, and 
h . 34 towns 1p. In analyzing the statutory provision, the 
I d . 1 . d 35 n 1ana supreme court exp a1ne , 
[T]he legislature enacted that the sums 
of money arising annually from these latter 
sources [i.e., state funds and tax revenues], 
· should be just as unequally distributed in 
the townships of the several counties, as was 
the interest on the congressional township 
fund, but in inverse order, so that the aggre-
gate amount, from the two sources, viz., the 
congressional township fund and the appropria-
tions on the part of the state, distributed 
in each township, should, relatively to the 
number of scholars therein, be equal. 
22 
The facts of, Qu,lc.k. v. WhLte-WateJC T own.J.i h,i.y}.6 outline 
the practice of reducing state aid .. On May 3, 1855, there 
\ 
were 435 dollars and 17 cents in accrued interest on the 
congressional townsh;ip fund in White-Water township .. At 
.the same time, there were 608 children entitled to distri-
bution of the school fund. Thus, the per capita distribu-
tion of the fund amounted to a fraction over 71 cents. 
If the state appropriations had been made by the 
treasurer of Franklin county to each local educational 
agency without regard to the principle of equalization 
outlined above, each eligible child in White-Water town-
ship would have drawn, from that source, 72 cents, which, 
when combined with the 71 cents from the congressional 
township fund, would have amounted to 143 cents per stu-
dent. The complaint in the case alleged, however, that if 
the equalization under the state statute were carried out, 
each child in White-Water township would have received, 
from both sources, only 109 cents. Since the congression-
al township fund was fixed at 71 cents per student, it is 
apparent that the state aid commitment to White-Water was 
to be reduced to 38 cents from 72 cents per student in an 
effort to equalize per student funds countywide, as re-
quired by the statute. 
In deciding whether to grant the complainant a perma-
nent injunction against the auditor and treasurer of 
Franklin county, prohibiting the distribution of the state 
appropriations according to the 1855 statute, the court 
23 
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relied on the first sectioh of article eight of the Indi-
1, 
ana constitution. 37 The Indiana supreme court held in the 
\ 
instant case, consistent with its holding in State v. 
Spning6ield ToWn4hiR, 38 that the state constit~tion not 
1 . d b , . , d- 39 on y perm1tte, ut require 
1. That the intJrest on the congre~sional 
township fund shall be distributed, or remain 
with the townships, alike unequally as the fund 
itself exists unequally in the townships. 
In order to carry out the provisions of article eight, 
section one of the constitution, however, the court fur-
ther held40 
2. That the proceeds of the whole of 
the common school fund, of which, as we have 
seen, the congressional township fund is to 
be considered, in distribution, a part, are 
to be so distributed as to produce equality 
and uniformity in the school system through-
out the state; and as a necessity, therefore, 
3. That the proceeds of the said fund, 
other than the interest on the congressional 
township fund, must be unequally distributed, 
in order to produce the equality required by 
the constitution in the final result. Instead, 
therefore, of the prohibition of, we find a 
command for, an unequal distribution of the 
school fund, other than the congressional por-
tion of it. 
Quiek v. White-Waten Town4hip thus represents the 
initial judicial sanction of a reduction of state aid to a 
local educational agency because of the agency's receipt 
of federal funds. It is significant that the court found 
the reduction required by the Indiana constitution's di-
rective to the legislature to provide for a uniform system 
of common schools. After treating the Indiana constitution 
24 
as the law dispositive of the case, and after determining 
that the state statutory provision did not conflict with, 
but was, indeed, required by, the state constitution, how-
ever, the court did deal rather summarily with the notion 
of a possible conflict between the state !tatute and the 
' 
f d 1 1 • 1 • I • 41 e era eg1s at1on s intent. 
The law does not conflict with any act 
of congress, as it does not assume to vary 
the distribution of the congressional town-
ship fund from the conditions of the grant. 
Quick v. Laurel Township (1861) 
In Quiek v. White-Wate~ Town-0hip the Indiana consti-
tution was found not only not to protect the local educa-
tional agency against a reduction in state aid funds as a 
consequence of receiving federal assistance, but also to 
require such a reduction in its attempt to provide equali-
ty and uniformity in the schools of the state. The Indi-
ana supreme court affirmed its position five years later 
in Quiek v. Lau~el Town-0hip, 42 where it was given the op-
portunity to reconsider its interpretation of the consti-
tutional mandates, by reversing a judgment of the Franklin 
. . . 43 c1rcu1t court 
for the reasons given in Quiek et al. v. White-
Wate~ Town-0hip, 7 Ind. 570, the questions arising 
in the record of each case being similar. 
Quick~· Springfield Township (1856) 
The third case in the instant line, Quiek v. 
25 
44 Sp1t..ing6.ield T oWn.6 h.ip, confirmed the holding of Qu.ic.k v. 
Wh.i.te-Wa..te1t. Town-0h.ip 45 regarding the la,:k of a conflict 
between the federal and state statutes. Whi:Le the court 
does not discuss the facts of the case in its opinion, it 
appears the plaintiff, Springfield township, sought a per-
manent injunction against the auditor and treasurer of 
F kl . l . . 46 ran in county, c aiming 
the annual income arising from that [congres-
sional township] fund shall not be taken into 
account, as said act [i.e., the act of March 5, 
1855] requires, in making distribution of the 
revenues of the state derived from other trust 
funds and from taxation. 
The plaintiff township's attack was two-fold. First, 
as had White-Water township's complaint in Quick v. Whi.te-
Wa..tell. Town.6hip, 47 the co~plaint in the instant case alleged 
that the state statute violated the state constitution. 
Second, and of major significance, the complaint in Quick 
v. Sp1t..ing6ield Town-0hip raised again, as had the complaint 
in Whi.te-Wa..tell. Town-0h.ip, the issue of whether the state 
statute violated the act of Congress making the congres-
. 1 h. 48 siona towns ip grants. Since the Whi.te-Wa..tell. Town-0hip 
decision had been based on the provisions of the Indiana 
constitution primarily, with the potential conflict between 
the federal and state legislation considered only in pass-
ing, it may have been expected that this second case 
alleging a conflict between the state act of March 5, 1855, 
and the Congressional Act of April 19, 1816, would have 
\ 
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examined more closely ,the relationship between those legis-
lative enactments. 
Again the Supreme Court of Indiana~ however, turned 
primarily to the Indiana constitution in its holding. The 
issue, as 49 formulated by the court, was whether 
the people of the state, while seeking by a 
constitution to devise a system which should 
convey the means of instruction equally to 
every child in the state, [had] the power, 
by virtue of her sovereignty, so to discrimi-
nate between those already provided with a 
fund, and those who had no such provision, 
as to place them upon an equality. 
The argument of the plaintiff was that the school law 
of 1855 did indirectly what the school law of 1852 had at-
tempted to do directly. The court adhered to its decision 
in State v. Sp~ing 0ield Town¢hip, 50 which had held that 
the legislative attempt to consolidate the congressional 
township fund with other funds of the state was void. The 
court, however, indicated that while the legislation dealt 
with in that case attempted to take away funds from the 
inhabitants of Springfield township, no such attempt was 
made in the act of March 5, 1855. 51 
There is certainly a material difference be-
tween taking away what one has, and the refusal 
to give him more. So far as the constitution 
affects the question, the power to discriminate 
exists, unless it is prohibited, and the pro-
hibition is neither pointed out, nor have we 
been able to find it in that instrument. 
The court then directed its attention to the congres-
sional enactment making the grants, as it had in State v. 
Sp~ing6ield Town~hip. 52 While in that case the search 
27 
for the purpose of the federal legislation was to deter-
mine whether that purpose was being adhered to faithfully, 
' 
as the Indiana constitution required, the search in the 
instant case apparently was to determine Whether there was 
a conflict between the state and federal legislation. The 
court held, 53 
What we have said disposes of the other 
point. The act [of March 5, 1855) does not 
conflict with the act of congress making the 
grant, nor in any manner attempt to interfere 
with it. 
Quiek v. Spning6ield Town~hip restated the two-major 
holdings of Quiek v. White-Waten Town~hip. 54 First, the 
Indiana supreme court affirmed its position that although 
a potential conflict between the state and federal legis-
lation was raised as an issue in both cases, the control-
ling law in cases of the kind of Quiek v. Spning6ield 
Town~hip and Quiek v. White-Waten Town~hip was to be the 
Indiana constitution. In its decision in each case, the 
court turned first to the constitutional provision re-
quiring a uniform statewide school system, and concluded 
that the federal effort could aid in achieving that goal. 
Second, the court's language in describing the effect 
of the state statute on the federal aid in Quiek v. Spning-
6ield Town~hip appears to be to the same point, although 
expressed in broader terms, than the corresponding language 
in Quiek v. White-Waten Town~hip. In each case, the court 
held that the Indiana school law of 1855 did not conflict 
with the Act of Congress making the grant in question. 55 
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In. QLi.ic.k. v. Wh..i:te.-Wa.te.Jt Town.J.ihip it was further observed 
that the reason for such a· holding was that the state act 
"does not assume to vary the distribution of the congres-
sional township fund from the conditions of the grant. 1156 
In Quic.k. v. Sp1tin.g6ie.ld Town.J.ihip, however, the court of-
fered no reason for its position, but expanded slightly 
its conclusion to include that the state legislation did 
not "in any manner attempt to interfere with1157 the Act of 
Congress making the grant. 
State v. Mathews (1898) 
The facts of the final case in this sequence of In-
diana supreme court decisions went beyond an attempted di-
version of funds provided by Congress, 58 ind a mere 
reduction in the amount of state aid to a local education-
al agency based on the presence of a source of funds pro-
. 59 60 v1ded by the federal government. Sta.te. v. Ma.the.wJ.i 
confronted the elimination of state aid to a local educa-
tional agency as a consequence of that agency having re-
ceived federal funds. 
The plaintiff in State. v. Ma.the.w-0 61 sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel the Monroe county auditor to distribute 
state school funds to Perry township. The funds in ques-
tion were generated by a state tax on the real estate and 
personal property in Perry in 1895, and were to be distri-
62 buted on the last Monday of January, 1897. At that 
time, the interest on the congressional township fund 
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belonging to Pe~ry towrtsbip amourited to 525 dollars and 39 
cents, or one doll~r 1 and 4~ cents per student. 
Exclusive of the congressional township fund belong-
ing to Perry, the entire common s~hool fund available for 
distribution in Monroe courity in Jartuary, 1897, was 8,328 
dollars and 11 cents. The children of school age in the 
county, exclusive of those in Perry township, numbered 
5,926; thus, the per.capita fund available to the students 
in Monroe, outside of Perry township, amounted to just 
over one dollar and 40 cents. Since this amount was less 
than the per pupil fund available to the Perry students 
from the Perry congressional township fund, the county 
auditor had refused to distribute any of the common school 
fund, exclusive of its congressional township fund, to 
63 Perry. 
In affirming the Monroe circuit court's denial of the 
writ, and thereby permitting an exclusion of state aid to 
Perry township, the Indiana supreme court held64 
that said Perry township was not entitled to 
any of the school fund collected from the tax 
assessed under the general law, so long as 
the interest on her congressional fund alone 
amounts to more pe~ capita, as appears by the 
facts found, than was left in the hands of 
the county auditor to apportion to the other 
townships. 
The court did consider the purpose of the congressional 
enactment as controlling the issue of the use of the 
funds. In relying in part on State v. Sp~lngoield Town-
h . 65 h b d 66 ~ ~P, t e court o serve , 
The only reason why in attempting to 
equalize the distribution of the school fund 
by ~he State a portion of this may not be 
taken away, is that the terms of the congres-
sional grant by which it was made forbid it. 
30 
The instant court, however, extended its QulQR v. Whlte-
Wate4 Town6hlp and Qu{Qk v. Spnlng6leld Town6hlp decisions 
to the elimination of state aid, relying, in part, on 
those very decisions. 67 
But it is settled law in this State that the 
common school fund derived from other sources 
may be validly and constitutionally unequally 
distributed by statutory authority, so as to 
make the whole, including the congressional 
township fund, when distributed, as nearly 
equal pen Qaplta to each school corporation 
as possible. 
Summary of the Congressional 
Township Fund Cases 
The acts of Congress first reserving and then grant-
ing sections numbered sixteen were rather vague in ex-
pressing the intent of Congress concerning the uses of the 
grants. The general philosophy that the sections, and the 
proceeds of the sales thereof after such sales were au-
thorized by Congress, were to be used for the maintenance, 
support, and use of schools within the respective town-
ships is found consistently in the four pieces of federal 
legislation analyzed. The fact remains, however, that 
Congress specified virtually nothing with respect to the 
administration of the reservations and grants made. 
The reservations and the initial grants of the Con-
gress took the form of land. By 1828, however, Congress 
had authorized the conversion of land into proceeds of a 
sale, and it should be noted that in none of the cases 
discussed was the fact that the original grant was in a 
form other than money crucial. Indeed, the first case 
discussed was not handed down until some 26 years after 
31 
Congress authorized the sale of the sections in question, 
and dealt with the income from the proceeds of such a 
sale. 
Under the provisions of the federal acts, it is very 
clear that the donees or payees of the grants were the in-
habitants of the respective townships. While there is . 
authority in both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Indiana supreme court for virtually equating "inhabitants" 
in such a context with the "local educational agency" of 
today, neither court was willing to consider the state as 
having any title or interest in the grant. 
Since Congress had expressed only a general purpose 
and not an administrative formula for applying the grants, 
the courts in these decisions from 1854 to 1898 could look 
to no federal authority to resolve the primary issue 
raised by these cases. The Indiana supreme court consis-
tently found the state constitution the controlling au-
thority, with state statutory provisions merely filling in 
the specifics required by the constitution. 
32 
The language in ~tate. v. Spning6ie.ld Tawn-0hip 68 indi-
cates that when grants are made under conditions and cir-
cumstances as above described, those grants must be applied 
to the use specified by Congress, and for the benefit of 
those persons contemplated by the federal act. The court, 
however, did not reach such a conclusion based on federal 
authority. The requirements concerning the application of 
the grant were embodied in the state constitution, in that 
the constitution required the state to apply all trust 
funds to the purpose for which the trust was created. 
This requirement was read to prohibit, specifically, the 
diversion of funds,provided one local educational agency 
for the support of common schools to another local educa-
tional agency. 
Quiek. v. White.-Wate.n Tawn-0hip, 69 Quiek. v. Spning6ie.ld 
Town-0hip, 70 and Quiek. v. Laune.l Town-0hip 71 distinguish a 
reduction in state aid to a local educational agency as a 
consequence of that agency receiving federal funds under 
the congressional township fund legislation from a diver-
sion of funds provided one local educational agency for 
the support of common schools to another local educational 
agency. In these cases the former state action was sane-
tioned, while State. v. Spning6ie.ld Town~hip'~ repudiation 
of the latter was adhered to in Qu.iek. v. Spning 6,le.ld Town-
h . 7 2 ~ ..(.p. These cases establish the position that state aid 
can be reduced to a local educational agency as a conse-
quence of it receiving federal funds, as required by state 
33 
law (in these instances, a constitutional provision), pro~ 
vide4 the specific funds g~anted by Congress are not tam-
pered with by the state provision requiring or authorizing 
the reduction. 
h h d . . . M h 73 . h Te ol 1ng 1n State v. at ew~ 1st e logical ex-
tension of the three "reduction" cases. 74 The Indiana 
supreme court merely extended its "reduction of state aid" 
rationale to an "elimination of state aid," and sanctioned 
the elimination of state aid to a local educational agency 
as a consequence of that agency receiving federal funds, 
while again upholding its State v. Sp~ing6ield Town~hip 
decision. Thus, it can be concluded that while a tamper-
ing with funds provided a local educational agency by a 
federal grant will not be upheld when such a tampering 
violates a state constitutional provision; where a compan-
ion state constitutional provision is found to require the 
reduction or elimination of state aid to a local educa-
tional agency as a consequence of that agency receiving 
federal funds, there is no prohibition against such a re-
duction or elimination available to such local educational 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NATIONAL FOREST RESERVE AND FEDERAL 
FLOOD CONTROL AID AND LITIGATION 
The Relevant Statutory Provisions 
The second series of cases dealing with reductions in 
state aid to local educational agencies as a result of 
those agencies receiving federal aid funds began in the 
early 1920s. The most recent decision of the line was 
handed down July 27, 1972, by the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington. Involved in these decisions were funds provided 
by national forest reserve legislation1 and federal flood 
1 1 . 1 . 2 contro eg1s at1on. 
The initial litigation, King County, Wa-0hingon, v. 
Seattle Sehool Vi-0tnict No. 1! interpreted the Act of Con-
gress of May 23, 1908, providing, 4 
Twenty-five per centum of all moneys re-
ceived during any fiscal year from each national 
forest shall be paid~ at the end of such year, 
by the Secretary of the Treasury to the State 
in which such national forest is situated, to 
be expended as the State legislature may pre-
scribe for the benefit of the public schools 
and public roads of the county or counties in 
which such national forest is situated: Pno-
vided, That when any national forest is in more 
than one State or county the distributive share 
to each from the proceeds of such forest shall 
be proportional to its area therein. In sales 
of logs, ties, poles, posts, cordwood, pulpwood, 
39 
and other forest product~ the amounts made 
available for schools and ioads by this sec-
tion shall be based upon the stumpage value 
of the timber. 
Significant differences are observable betweeri the 
40 
above-quoted statutory language and the language of the 
Act of Congress of April 19, 1816. The national forest 
legislation directs that the specific aid (moneys) under 
consideration. "shall be paid ... to the State, 115 whereas 
the Indiana enabling act provided that the aid (land) 
"shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township. 116 
Differences in both the type of aid and the donee of the 
payments are apparent. Furthermore, the purposes to which 
the funds were to be applied included a non-educational 
use ("for the benefit of the public schools and public 
roads of the county or counties in which such national 
forest is situated • 117 ) in the forest reserve lefiisla-
tion while the Act of 1816 required that the laid be ap-
plied "for the use of schools. 118 Even when the Indiana 
legislature was authorized in 1828 to sell the land, the 
proceeds were to be used "for the use and support of 
schools. 119 
Grants similar to those provided in the national 
f 1 . l . 10 orest eg1s at1on are found in the federal flood con-
1 1 . l . 11 tro eg1s at1on. The latter statutory provision re-
. 12 quires 
75 per centum of all moneys received and 
deposited in the Treasury of the United States 
during any fiscal year on account of the leas-
ing of lands acquired by the United States for 
flood-control purposes shall be paid ftt-the 
end of such year by the Secretary of the 
Treasury to the State in which ~uch property 
is situated, to be expended as the State 
legislature may prescribe for the benefit of 
public schools and public roads of the county, 
or counties, in which such property is situ-
ated: ... 
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Like the national forest legislation, the above statutory 
language provides aid in the form of moneys, and desig-
nates the state as the payee of the aid funds. The non-
educational use ("the benefit of ... public roads 1113 ) is 
also the same as in the national forest measure. 
It is important to observe at this point that the 
sections of the federal statutes quoted hereto include all 
language in which Congress has expressed its intentions 
concerning the aid funds provided. In the national forest 
1 . 1 . 14 h . 1 h" h b "d d eg1s at1on t ere 1s no cause w 1c can e cons1 ere a 
"congressional will" clause, nor is there any intent of 
Congress provision. In 1960, the following language was 
enacted, but still no mention is made of the congressional 
intent concerning the funds provided for education: 15 
It is the policy of the Congress that 
the national forests are established and shall 
be administered for outdoor recreation, range, 
timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish pur-
poses .... 
In the federal flood control legislation, two lengthy 
"declaration of policy1116 sections have been included, but 
neither of them mentions the aid to education funds pro-
vided by the legislation. 
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It was the additional ~ppr9ved use of benefiting the 
public roads that gave rise to the controversy in King 
County, Wa~hington, v. ~~attle School Vl~t~ict No. 7. 17 
A Washington state statute directed the state treasurer to 
turn over to the county treasurers each county's share of 
aid provided by the national forest legisiation, and fur-
ther provided that "county commissioners of the respective 
counties to which the money is distributed are hereby au-
thorized and directed to expend said money for the benefit 
of the public schools and public roads there;£, and not 
otherwise. 1118 
Since part of the Snoqualmie Forest Reserve was loca-
ted in King county, 20,106 dollars and 67 cents were turned 
over to the county treasurer from 1908 through 1918, in-
elusive, by the state treasurer from the proper amounts 
paid to the state by the Secretary of the Treasury. In 
1908, 1916, 1917, and 1918, the county commissioners appor-
tioned one-half of the year's allotment to the county school 
fund, and the other half of the year's allotment to the 
county's road and bridge fund. From 1909 through 1915, 
inclusive, however, the commissioners directed that all 
the funds provided by the national forest legislation be 
assigned to the road and bridge fund. The county treasurer 
made the distributions as directed. 
Of the total amount distributed by the county 
treasurer from 1908 through 1918, 18,481 dollars and 43 
cents were assigned to the road and bridge fund, while 
1,624 dollars and 64 cents went to, the common school fund. 
The latter amount is 8,428 dollars and 40 cents less than 
one-half the total received by the county. 
Seattle School District No. 1, one of King county's 
school districts, claimed19 
to be entitled to such proportion of one-half 
the amount received in each year by the county 
as the annual school attendance in the dis-
trict bore to the total attendance in all dis-
tricts of the county. The amounts so claimed 
make a total of $6,789.22. 
In overturning the federal district court's decree 
declaring the county and its treasurer to be trustees, re-
quiring them to account, and allowing the school district 
to recover the sum claimed, the Court addressed the issue 20 
whether the act [16 U.S.C. § 500 (1970)] per-
mits the money so received.by the county to 
be expended by the commissioners as directed 
by the state legislature, or requires an equal 
distribution annually for the benefit of pub-
lic schools and public roads of the county. 
The Court seemed to place considerable emphasis on who the 
payee of the aid funds was, and refused to find that a 
trust had been created by Congress in favor of the school 
district. 21 
When turned over to the State, the money 
belongs to it absolutely. There is no limita-
tion upon the power of the legislature to pre-
scribe how the expenditures shall be made for 
the purposes stated .... No trust for the 
benefit of appellee [school district] is crea-
ted by the grant. 
The Court held the funds provided by the federal legisla-
tion to be "assets in the hands of the State to be used 
for the specified purposes as it deems best. 1122 
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It is apparent that the only limitations on state 
discretion with respect to the application of the funds 
provided by the federal government to the states are to be 
found in the language of the federal legislation granting 
those funds. This rationale has been followed consistent-
ly in all of the cases dealing with the national forest 
reserve funds 23 and the federal flood control rentals 24 
relevant to this study. From the language in King County, 
however, state discretion may be concluded to rest on the 
fact that the state was named as the payee of the funds 
provided by the federal statute under consideration. It 
should be recalled that where the inhabitants of townships 
(a,nd, by court recognition, local educational agencies) 
were the payees of the grant, the state could not divert 
the federal aid funds provided, 25 but could exercise wide 
discretion only with respect to other funds available to 
it for the support of public schools. 26 
The Forest Reserve and Flood 
Control Litigation 
The initial litigation concerning a state's reduction 
of school aid funds under either the forest reserve or 
flood control statutes resulted in a decision favorable to 
the local educational agency involved. The principle ob-
served 1n King County, however, of discretion being vested 
in the state as payee of the federal funds was upheld. 
While King Coun~y did not involve a reduction of state aid 
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funds because a local school district received federal 
aid, it did establish the right of the state to determine 
the use of the federal funds, provided the use was not in-
consistent with the federal grant. 
State ex rel. Board of Education of In-
dependent School Dist. No. !2_ of Wagoner 
County ~ State Board of Education (1953) 
In State ex rel. Boand oo Education oo Independent 
School Vi-0t. No. 79 o0 Wagonen County v. State Boand oo 
Education, 27 the federal aid funds in que~tion were pro-
vided by the flood control legislation. 28 The Oklahoma 
legislature provided for a distribution of these federal 
funds as follows: 29 
The State Treasurer of Oklahoma is here-
by authorized to distribute moneys now in his 
hands, or hereafter received by him under the 
provisions of Section 7 of the Flood Control 
Act of Congress, approved August 18, 1941, in 
the following manner: 
Such moneys shall be distributed by the 
State Treasurer at the end of each fiscal year 
to counties wherein is located a federal flood 
control project, and one-half(~) of such mon-
eys shall be distributed to the County Trea-
surer of such county to be by the County Trea-
surer apportioned to the public schools of the 
county upon an enumeration basis; ... 
The legislature of Oklahoma had provided a system of 
state aid to local school districts, the amount of such 
aid to be determined by subtracting the amount of a school 
district's "Minimum Program Income" from the costs of its 
"Minimum Program." The legislature had directed that a 
district's "Minimum Program Income" was to include30 
a. Income from a levy of fifteen (15) mills 
actually made by a school distric~, and as 
to separate schools a levy of two· and twenty-
five hundreths (2.25) mills actually made in 
any county, on the assessed valuation. A ten 
per cent (10%) deduction shall be allowed for 
delinquent taxes. 
b. State Apportionment. 
c. County Apportionment. 
d. Gross Production Tax. 
e. Intangible Tax. 
Each of the above-mentioned items of Minimum 
Program Income from (b) to (e) inclusive, shall 
be ninety per cent (90%) of the amount actually 
collected from such source during the next pre-
ceding fiscal year calculated on per capita 
basis on the unit provided by law for the dis-
tribution of each such revenue. 
f. Basic aid actual amount allocated by State 
Board of Education. 
g. Auto License and Farm Truck actual collec-
tions during the previous year computed on a 
per capita average daily attendance basis. 
h. Transfer fees, as are now or shall here-
after be provided by law, in an amount equal 
to the amount which has been or should have 
been so appropriated, in the budgets of the 
sending districts for the u~e and benefit of 
the receiving districts. 
i. And all other revenue which can legally 
be estimated by the county excise board, as 
now provided by law or which shall hereafter 
be provided by law, except surplus cash and 
taxes in process of collection, tuition fees 
from pupils or their parents or guardians, 
state assistance and reimbursements for spe-
cial programs, Fede~al g~ant~ 06 aid and ~e-
imbu..~~ ement~. 
In Wagone~ Cou..nty, 31 
46 
. I. 
[i]t was shown that the said school districts 
each, for the fiscal year h~re involved, were 
apportioned 'State Aid' in an amount, respec-, 
tively, as was determined by the subtraction 
of its 'Minimum Program Income' from the cost 
of its 'Minimum Program' with its respecti~e 
estimated revenues from 'Flood Control Rent-
als' included in the computation as an item 
of its minimum program income. 
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The issue, as formulated by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 
was 32 
whether or not an item of estimated revenue 
from 'Flood Control Rentals' may properly be 
considered as an item of 'Minimum Program In-
come' in the calculation of a school dis-
trict's apportionment of state aid. 
In deciding the issue in the negative, and in allow-
ing the plaintiff school districts an apportionment of 
additional state aid, the court relied solely on the lan-
guage of the state statute. 33 
The phrase 'Federal grants of aid and 
reimbursement' as used in the statute in a 
reference to the income of a school district 
clearly means all federal grants of money 
provided by law as income to a school dis-
trict and whether the purpose of such grants 
is to extend aid or help or to serve as a 
reimbursement in the sense of a refunding or 
restoration. Accordingly, revenues from 
'Flood Control Rentals' received or to be 
received by a school district pursuant to 
the Act of Congress and§ 204, supra, which 
provides for a transfer of federal funds to 
the benefit of public schools, and ultimate\y 
to a school district, are under the statute, 
§ 18-4, excepted from the definition of 
'Minimum Program Income' and under said 
§ 18-4 such revenues are not to be consid-
ered in the calculation of state aid. 
The court, in the above holding, relied on no federal 
statute, nor congressional intent found therein, nor on 
any federal or state constitutional provision. By virtue 
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of the state statutory language, said the court in Wagonen ,, 
County, the state itself had precluded the possibility of 
the state reducing state aid because of the receipt of 
federal flood control funds by school districts. 
It should be observed that the statutory provisions 
interpreted in Wagonen County were found in the Oklahoma 
Statutes Supplement of 1949. In 1951, however, the state 
legislatu_re amended what the Wagonen Coun;~y court had 
34 found to be the controlling language, and subsequent 
state aid to local educational agencies reductions were 
d d h . . 35 soon teste un er t e new provision. 
State ex rel. Boards of Education of 
Independent School Districts No. 1-2 
and No. 1-3 of Marshall County~ 
State Board of Education (1955) 
In State ex rel. Boandh on Education on Independent 
School Vihtnicth No. 1-2 and No. 1-3 06 Manhhall County v. 
State Boand 06 Education, 36 apportionment of state aid to 
the plaintiffs under the "Minimum School Program" was re-
<luted by the exact amount of the flood control rentals in-
cluded by the defendants in "Minimum Program Income" of 
the fiscal years ending June 30, 1952, and June 30, 1953. 
The plaintiff boards of education brought suit for a per-
emptory writ of mandamus in an effort to obtain a reappor-
tionment of state aids funds for those years, contending 
that the flood control rentals under both state and federal 
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statutory provisions were excepted from "Minimum Program 
Income." 
After noting its decisio~ in Wagone4 County, the Ok-
lahoma supreme court further observed that_ the statutory 
language of its previous decision had been changed by the 
Oklahoma legislature. The pertinent paragraph for the 
years in question in Ma4.6hall County indicated that to 
included in "Minimum Program Income" was 37 
i. And all other revenue, including the amounts 
required by law to be charged and collected for 
tuition or nonresident and nontransferred pupils, 
which can legally be estimated by the county ex-
cise board, as now provided by law, 0r which 
shall hereafter be provided by law, ,~xc.ept sur-
plus cash and taxes in the process oi collection, 
State Aid for Special Educational Program and 
Fede~al ~e~mbu~.6ement.6 60~ app~oved voc.at~onal 
p~o g~am.6. 
The prohibition against including federal grants of aid 
be 
and general reimbursements in "Minimum Program Income" had 
been changed by the legislature to a prohibition against 
including only federal reimbursements for approved voca-
tional programs in such income. Because of the change in 
statutory language,-the court had no trouble allowing the 
flood control rentals to be included in "Minimum Program 
Income" in Ma~.6hall County, thus affecting a reduction in 
state aid due to an infusion of federal funds under a pro-
gram in which Congress had not declared its intent with 
respect to the use of those funds. 
The plaintiffs in Ma~.6hall County did make an attempt 
to have the Oklahoma supreme court read into the federal 
. -3g 
legislation a favorable statement of policy. 
It is argued by plaintiffs that to redu~e 
State Aid to these districts by the amount of 
Flood Control Rentals they receive is a vio-
lation of the Flood Control Act of Congress 
because it has the effect of depriving these 
school districts of the benefits thereof. In 
other words, they point out that if the school 
districts are to lose an amount of State Aid 
equal to the receipts from 'Flood Control 
Rentals' they gain nothing by receiving Flood 
Control Rentals. 
so 
The court reasoned, however, that such a construction 
of the federal statute as requested by the plaintiffs 
would amount to federal dictation as to how state funds 
were to be distributed. 39 
... But we do not construe the Federal 
Statute as attempting to control the method 
by which this State apportions its own funds 
appropriated for Equalization Aid to its 
schools. There is, therefore, no violation 
of the Federal Statute. 
State ex rel. Board of Education of --- -- ---
Independent School District No. !2. 
(Coweta) of Wagoner County v. State 
Board of Education (1955) 
The decision in Man~hall County was handed down 
October 11, 1955. Two weeks later, on October 25, the 
court was given an opportunity to reverse its position in 
State ex rel. Boand 06 Education 06 Independent School 
Vi-0tnict No. 17 (Coweta) o0 Wagonen County v. State Boand 
06 Education. 40 The facts of the two cases were virtually 
the same, with the state's action for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1953, questioned in Coweta. In denying 
the plaintiffs' request for reapportionment and further 
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distribution of state equalization aid, the court, citing 
Ma4-0hall County, concluded41 
that 'Flood Control Rentals' are proper items 
of revenue to be included in 'Minimum Program 
Income' under provisions of 70 O.S.1951 § 18-4, 
subdivision 2, par. i. 
The impact of Wagonen County, Ma4~hall County, and 
Coweta is clear. Where there is no declaration of con-
gressional intent with respect to funds provided under 
federal legislation for local school district use, courts 
are free to interpret state statutory provisions affecting 
the use of those funds without the danger of violating 
federal law. In Wagonen County, where the result of the 
suit challenging a reduction in state aid as a consequence 
of a local educational agency receiving federal assistance 
was favorable to the local district, such result was due 
to the wording of the state statutory provision involved. 
The statute itself provided for no reduction in state aid 
to the local school districts receiving federal assistance 
under the program involved. 
In Man~hall County and Coweta, an opposite result, 
unfavorable to the local districts involved, was also 
predicated on the language employed in the governing state 
statutory provision. It is apparent that no "loss of the 
benefits intended by the Congress" theory is available to 
local school districts striving to retain state aid 
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\ 
unreduced by federal ~ssistance. Where Cotigress fails to 
ditect this result, ~he ~~se~ discussed in this study to 
this point indicate that language sympathetic to the local 
educational agency's cause will have to be found in either 
th t t "t. . 42 h . 43 1"f h es a e const1 ut1on .or t e ~tate statutes tat 
agency is to be afforded the protection it desires. 
State ex rel. Board of Education of 
Independent School District No._!.&. 
(Le Flore) of Le Flore County v. State 
Board of Education (1956) 
It should not be assumed that the rationale of Waganen 
County, Man-0hall County, and Coweta applies only to fed-
eral funds which the Wagonen County court called "Flood 
Control Rentals. 1144 In State ex rel. Baand 06 Educ.at.lon 
06 Independent Sc.hoot V.l-0tn.lc.t Na. 16 (Le Flone) 06 Le 
Flane County v. State Baand 06 Educ.at.lon, 45 the plaintiffs 
were school districts of Le Flore county, in which was 
located a national forest reserve contiguous to the dis-
tricts. These districts had been receiving federal assis-
tance under the same federal statutory provisions 46 
discussed in King Caunty. 47 
The funds provided by the forest reserve legislation 
were distributed by the Oklahoma legislature according to 
the following statute, which has remained unchanged since 
1941: 48 
Rental from forest reserves - Disposition 
and apportionment. - From and after the pass-
age of this Act, each County Tre~surer of this 
State shall, out of any funds hereinafter re-
ceived by him from the United States Govern-
ment as said County's share of the rentals 
from Forest Reserves located therein, immedi-
ately apportion same as follows: 
1st. Twenty-five per centum of all money 
now on hand and hereinafter received to be 
prorated and apportioned among the various 
school districts of said counties situated and 
located contiguous to such Forest Reserves, 
according to the scholastic population there-
of; 
2nd. Seventy-five per cent (75%) of all 
such money now on hand and hereinafter received, 
shall be deposited in a special road fund to 
be expended on county highways leading into 
and away from such Forest Reserves, under the 
direction and supervision of the Board of 
County Commissioners of such County. 
For the same fiscal years involved in Mah~hall County, 
the defendants in Le Fiohe County included as income an 
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estimate of the amount of the federal forest reserve rent-
als in computing "Minimum Program Income" of the various 
districts under 70 O.S.1951 § 18-4, subd. 2, par. i, thus 
reducing, by the amount of such income, the apportionment 
of state aid to the respective districts under the Minimum 
School Program. 
The court in Le Flohe County found no practical dif-
ference in the national forest reserve and federal flood 
control legislation with respect to the educational funds 
provided and their application under the Oklahoma statutes. 
In denying the plaintiffs' request for a writ of mandamus 
to compel a reapportionment and further distribution of 
49 state equalization aid, the Oklahoma supreme court held, 
It is our opinion that for the same rea-
sons set forth in said case [i~e., Ma~~hall 
County], it is proper to include in 'Minimum 
Program Income' that revenue which is received 
from Forest reserve rentals, there being no-
thing in the applicable statutes to justify 
a different rule as between the two sources 
of income. 
Carroll v. Bruno (1972) 
The final case in the instant line of authority 
demonstrates that judicial thinking concerning reduc-
tions in state aid to local educational agencies who 
receive federal funds under the national forest reserve 
and federal flood control programs has not changed. In 
Cahholl v. Bhuno, 50 the Supreme Court of Washington was 
faced with an attack by local school districts against 
the state superintendent of public instruction for the 
way in which state equalization aid was being distribu-
ted. 
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After recognizing that the United States owned a num-
her of national forests which were not subject to state or 
local taxation, the court explained the purpose of the 
provision of funds under the national forest legislation.51 
As a contribution in lieu of taxes, the fed-
eral government pays to the state each year 
25 per cent of all moneys received from nation-
al forest services. 16 U.S.C. § 500 (1960). 
The national forest funds are by law earmarked 
for the benefit of the public schools and pub-
lic roads of the counties in which the nation-
al forests are situated. 
It must be pointed out that the Cahholl court was the 
first to mention the reason for the federal payments under 
55 
\ 
the national forest legislation. In being the first court 
in this line of ~ecisions to ~fiserve that :such payments 
were made "[a]s a.contribution in lieu of taxes, 1152 the 
question must be raised whether the court had been influ-
enced by the federal decisions of the mid-1960s involving 
"impact areas aid. 1153 It has already been noted that the 
federal legislation itself is completely silent concerning 
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the purpose of the payments, and to suggest the source 
of the court's impression in Ca~~oll would be spetulation. 
A Washington state statute provided for the state 
superintendent of public instruction to include 85 per 
cent of the national forest funds allocable to the schools 
in distributing state equalization aid funds to school 
districts in which all the projected revenues available to 
the district fell below a state per-student minimum. 55 
Outlining the controversy of the case, the court said, 56 
Appellants [school districts] contend that the 
superintendent should not credit the school 
districts with receipt of the funds before 
determining the state contribution, but rather 
that the district should be. entitled to the 
state contribution and then, in addition, the 
federal forest moneys. 
Here the school districts took the position that 
since the federal legislation provided funds for distribu-
tion by the state only to those districts in which nation-
57 al forests were located, 
to include federal forest funds in the gener-
al statewide equalization formula spreads the 
benefits to the entire state and thus deprives 
the districts designated by federal law from 
the very benefits intended to be granted them. 
56 
/ 
The logic of this contention is somewhat compelling in 
light of the court's observ~tibn that the funds were pro-
vided, to some extent, at least, in lieu of local taxes. 
The districts argued that t~ey were being deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that the method of distribution contravened the 
statute which made the money available. 
The Ca~~oll court, in affirming the trial court's 
conclusion that the state superintendent's distribution 
was both constitutional and within the federal and state 
statutory schemes, relied heavily on the Oklahoma supreme 
court's decisions in Le Flo~e County 58 and Ma~Jhall 
County. 59 , 60 
[Le Flo~e County] discussed the same question 
as we have before us, i. e., whether Congress, 
in making federal forest funds available to 
the schools, intended to preclude the state 
from taking these funds into consideration 
when allocating state school equalization 
moneys to all of the state's districts. In 
that case, the court affirmed and adhered to 
the rationale of its earlier decision in 
State ex rel. Bds. of Ed., etc. v. State Board 
of Education, 289 P.2d 653 (Okl. 1955), hold-
ing it proper to reduce state aid to the school 
districts by the amount of federal flood con-
trol rentals paid by the United States to cer-
tain districts. 33 U.S.C. § 701c-3. The court 
said [289 P.2d, at 655]: [W]e do not construe 
the Federal Statute as attempting to control 
the method by which this State apportions its 
own funds appropriated for Equalization Aid 
to its schools. There is, therefore, no vio-
lation of the Federal Statute. 
Ca~~oll v. B~uno 61 serves to bring all of the cases 
discussed involving forest reserve and flood control edu-
cational aid funds up to date. By citing Le Flo~e County, 
57 
which had dealt with national forest reserve funds, and 
quoting Ma~~hall County, which had dealt with federal 
flood control funds, the Washington supreme court left no 
doubt that it would permit a state reduction in aid funds 
based on local educational agencies receiving federal mo-
neys under either program analyzed in this chapter. 
Summary of the Forest Reserve and 
Flood Control Cases 
Like the congressional township fund legislation re-
serving and granting land and money for the maintenance, 
support, and use of schools, the national forest reserve 
and federal flood control legislation lacks a specific 
statement by the Congress concerning its intent with re-
spect to the funds provided by these enactments. In the 
national forest legislation there was no declaration of 
policy included by the Congress until 1960, well after the 
majority of cases in this section had been decided. When 
such a declaration was enacted, it made no mention of the 
funds provided for educational purposes. The federal 
flood control legislation contains two lengthy declara-
tions of policy, neither of which have reference to the 
educational funds provided by the legislation. 
While the congressional township fund legislation ap-
pears to have provided funds for the maintenance, support, 
and use of schools, the general philosophy of the grants 
of the national forest reserve and federal flood control 
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legislation appears even more broad. In both instances, 
funds are provided for the "benefit of" public schools 
and public roads of specified geographic areas, i.e., the 
counties in which the forest reserves or flood control 
lands are located. It should be noted that the sections 
making the grants contemplate a non-educational benefit 
(i.e., that of the public roads) in these instances as 
well. Further, as the schools of particular townships 
were specified in the congressional township legislation, 
schools and roads of specified counties were named in the 
national forest reserve and federal flood control mea-
sures. 
It will be recalled that the initial reservations of 
the congressional township legislation was in terms of 
land, with Congress subsequently authorizing a conversion 
of that land into money. In the case of the instant stat-
utes, money is the type or form of benefit Congress has 
attempted to bestow. 
The major difference between the congressional town-
ship fund legislation on the one hand, and the national 
forest reserve and the federal flood control legislation 
on the other, is the donees or grantees named by Congress. 
In the former, the inhabitants of townships, and, by in-
terpretatio~, then, local educational agencies, were 
named as payees or grantees. In the latter two federal 
statutes, however, Congress named the states as payees 
of the grants. 
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In the cases involving the national forest reserve and 
federal flood control grants, the courts e~rly recognized 
the lack of federal directions concerning the application of 
the funds granted by Congress. Consistently the courts 
looked to statut6ry provisions enacted in the states as con-
trolling the disposition of the funds granted. While no 
state constitutional issues were raised in these cases, as 
were raised in the congressional township fund cases, each of 
the decisions discussed in this chapter held the state law to 
be controlling with respect to the application of the grants. 
An indication of the wide latitude to be accorded the 
states in the disposition of the funds paid to them under 
the national forest reserve legislation came early in the 
instant line of decisions. In King County, Wa~hlngton, v. 
Seattle SQhool Vl~tnlQt No. 7, 62 the Court held that the 
funds granted to the states belonged to them absolutely, 
to use in any way not inconsistent with the congressional 
grant. The Court did not read the language of the federal 
statute providing funds for the benefit of the public 
schools and public roads of specific counties to mean that 
both must share in that benefit each year (the frequency 
of the grants). Thus, a state statute whic'h permitted all 
of the benefit to go to public roads, pursuant to the ac-
tions of a board of county commissioners, was upheld. 
State ex rel. Boand 06 EduQatlon 06 Independent 
SQhool Vl~t. No. 19 06 Wagone~ County v. State Boa~d 06 
EduQatlon 63 provided the only victory in the instant line 
of cases for a local educational agency in its ~ffort to 
- prevent a reduction of state aid trr·that agency because 
that agency had received federal funds. It was a hollow 
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victory, however. The principle of state discretion with 
respect to the proceeds of the grant from the flood con-
trol legislation was established, as it had been with re-
spect to the national forest reserve legislation in K-ln.g 
County. Indeed, in finding the protection against a loss 
of state aid the local agencies wanted, the court looked 
to a state statute which the court found prohibited such 
a reduction. 
By the time State ex rel. Boand~ 06 Educat-lon. 06 
In.dependent School V-l~tn-lctb No. 7-2 and No. 1-3 06 Man-
bhall County v. State Boand 06 Educat-lon.64 and State ex 
rel. Boand 06 Education. 06 In.dependent School Vibtniet 
No. 17 (Coweta} 06 Wagon.en County v. State Boand 06 Eduea-
tion.65 were handed down, the state statute which had af-
forded the local educational agencies protection against 
a loss of state aid as a consequence of receiving federal 
funds under the federal flood control legisla~ion had been 
amended. Nevertheless, the Oklahoma supreme court in 
these cases found that the state statutory language still 
controlled the issue of whether such a reduction was law-
ful, and since such a reduction was no longer prohibited 
by the state statutes, the local educational agencies were 
no longer protected from such a loss. State ex rel. Boand 
06 Education 06 Independent School V-lbtniet No. 16 (Le 
Flo~e) 06 Le Flo~e County v. State Boa~d 06 EduQation66 
applied the same rationale to funds provided by the 
national forest reserve legislation that Ma~-0hall County 
and Coweta applied to funds received under the federal 
flood control legislation. 
Ca~~oll v. B~uno 67 served to update the holdings of 
the United States Supreme Court and the Oklahoma supreme 
· court discussed in this chapter~ Insofar as the lack of 
evidence of specific congressional intent and the con-
trolling nature of state authority is analogous, Ca~~oll 
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also updated the holdings of the Indiana supreme court in 
the congressional township fund cases. The Ca~~oll court 
was the only one to read into the national forest reserve 
legislation a declaration of congressional intent; never-
theless, the intent it supposed to be there was not suffi-
cient to override what it found to be the compelling logic 
of Le Flo~e County and Ma~-0hall County. By citing approv-
ingly both of these cases, the Ca~~oll court served notice 
that there is today, nearly 20 years after Le Flo~e County, 
still no protection afforded local educational agencies 
against a loss of state aid funds as a consequence of 
those agencies receiving funds, through the state, provi-
ded by Congress in the national forest reserve and federal 
flood control acts. 
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CHAP_TER IV 
THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT, THE 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCA-
TION ACT, AND THE IMPACT AREAS 
AID LEGISLATION 
A 1967 court opinion analyzed briefly three major 
statutory programs designed to provide financial aid to 
education, the last of which has served as a major focal 
point for late 1960s cases dealing with a reduction in 
state aid to local educational agencies as a consequence 
of those agencies receiving ~ederal funds. Hob4on v. Han-
4en1 was primarily a desegregation case, but the language 
employed in its opinion by the federal District Court for 
the District of Columbia foreshadowed subsequent decisions 
by more than a handful of other federal courts. 
The issue in Hob4on was 2 
whether the defendants, the Superintendent of 
Schools and the members of the Board of Educa-
tion, in the operation of the public school 
system here, unconstitutionally deprive the 
District's Negro and poor public school child-
ren of their right to equal educational_ oppor-
tµnity with the District's white and more 
affluent public school children. 
-Among the findings of the court was, 3 
The median annual per pupil expenditure ($292) 
in the predominantly (85-100%) Negro elementary 
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schools in the District of Columbia has been 
a flat $100 below the m~dian annual per pupil 
expenditure for its predominantly (85-100%) 
white schools ($392). 
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Additionally, the court.found, "Only recently, through the 
use of impact aid and other federal funds, have the Negro 
slum schools had sufficient textbooks for the children's 
4 use." 
In deciding that the Negro and poor children were 
being denied their right to equal educational opportunity 
unconstitutionally, the court held, 5 
The predominantly Negro schools, thus, 
are at comparative disadvantage in major respects. 
True, large dosages of federal financial assis-
tance are infused into the slum schools and 
those alone under the Economic Opportunity Act, 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
and the impact aid legislation. None of these, 
however, requires more than nominal loc~l con-
tributions, and so they have all but nil effect 
on how the Board disburses its own assets. 
Furthermore, these statutes are manifestly in-
tended to provide extraordinary services at 
slum schools, not merely to compensate for in-
equalities produced by local school boards in 
favor of their middle-income schools. Thus, 
they cannot be regarded as curing any inequali-
ties for which the Board is otherwise respon-
sible. 
The significant aspect of this language for purposes of 
this study is the recognition by the court of the purpose 
for which the federal funds cited had been granted, to 
wit: "to provide extraordinary services at the slum 
schools. 116 It is appropriate now to analyze the pertinent 
sections of the federal statutes construed to determine 
the bases of the Hob-0on decision and of those cases which 
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were to follow. The federal acts will be discussed in the 
order suggested by the Hob~on court. 
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
The portion of the Economic Opportunity Act cited in 
the footnote in Hab~on was Title II, "Urban and Rural Com-
munity Action Programs. 117 In its "Findings and Declara-
tion of Purpose118 for the entire Act, Congress had declared 
its objective "to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the 
midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to everyone the 
opportunity for education and training, . II Specifi-
cally, the "Statement of Purpose" of Part A, "General 
Community Action Programs," of Title II provided, 9 
The purpose of this part is to provide 
stimulation and incentive for urban and rural 
communities to mobilize their resources to 
combat poverty through community action pro-
grams. 
What were to be included in the category of community ac-
tion programs was spelled out rather specifically in the 
Act. l O 
That the type of aid to be provided by the Act was 
money, rather than some other form of property, is evident 
from the congressional reference to "sums appropriated to 
carry out this title. 1111 Furthermore, the funds appropri-
12 ated under the provisions of the act for the development 
d h . 13 f h . . an t e carrying out o t e community action programs 
were available to "public or private nonprofit agencies 1114 
as well as to states and state agencies. 15 In the latter 
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instances, the emphasis remained on the local level, how-
ever, since the payments to state agencies were authorized 
"for payment of the expenses of such agencies in providing 
technical assistance to communities in developing, con-
ducting, and administering community action programs. 1116 
The Congress ieft no doubt in Title II of the Econom-
ic Opportunity Act of 1964 that"the funds available to 
local public agencies were not to be used as general edu-
cational appropriations. The funds were to be available 
for programs "focused upon the needs of low-income indi-
viduals and families and shall provide expanded and im-
proved services, assistance, and other activities, and 
f ·1· . . . h . h 1117 ac1 1t1es necessary 1n connection t erew1t . 
language followed. 18 
No grant or contract authorized under 
this part may provide for general aid to 
elementary or secondary education in any 
school or school system. 
Specific 
While it is clear that federal dollars were made 
available under the Act to both local and state agencies 
for the purpose of providing expanded or improved services 
primarily to low-income individuals and families, it is 
equally clear that Congress was not attempting to assume 
financing responsibilities otherwise left to local educa-
tional agencies. While there is no prohibition in the Act 
against local educational agencies receiving a portion of 
the appropriated funds, it is clear from the language of 
subsection 205 (b) that Congress did not attempt to provide 
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funds to such agencies to use totally at their own discre-
tion. The specific prohibitio~ of subsection 205 (b) is 
probably the cause of the lack of litigation concerning 
the issue of whether a state can reduce its aid to a local 
educational agency because that agency has received funds 
under Part A, Title II; of the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964. Aside from Hob~on, only Rod~iguez v. San Antonio 
Independent Sehool Vi~t~let, 19 in6~a, has raised a similar 
issue, and in that case the court cited Hob~on as authori-
ty for answering the issue in the negative. 
The Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 
The Hob~on court applied the rationale it used in 
discussing the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to the 
provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
20 of 1965, as well. Indeed, there are striking similari-
,ties between the two acts in the type of aid provided, the 
purpose for which the aid was given, and the ultimate 
beneficiaries of such aid, even though the payees of the 
assistance may be different. 
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
comprises all but the final subsection of Subchapter II, 
Assistance to Local Educational Agencies for the Education 
of Children of Low-income Families, of Chapter 13, Finan-
cial Assistance to Local Educational Agencies, of Title 
20, Education, of the United States Code. Having remained 
' _) 
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substantially unchanged since the HobJon decision, the 
congressional declaration of purpose of the Act states, 21 
In recognition of the special education-
al needs of children of low-income f~milies 
and the impact that concentrations of low-in-
come families have on the ability of local 
educational agencies to support adequate edu-
cational programs, the Congress hereby de-
clares it to be the policy of the United States 
to provide financial assistance (as set forth 
in the following parts of this subchapter) to 
local educational agencies serving areas with 
concentrations of children from low-income 
families to expand _and improve their educa-
tional programs by various means (including 
preschool programs) which contribute parti-
cularly to meeting the special educational 
needs of educationally deprived children. 
Perhaps the most significant language in the statement of 
purpose is "to provide financial assistance ... to local 
educational agencies . to expand and improve their 
educational programs." As in the case of the Economic Op-
portunity Act, there is no evidence that Congress wished 
to assume the primary burden of financing public educa-
tion. Rather, the intent was clearly to aid or assist in 
expansion and improvement of the base on which local edu-
cational agencies could build. 
Again in this legislation, the Congress was providing 
22 aid in the form of money. While the states were author-
ized to participate to a limited extent as beneficiaries in 
the federal distribution of such aid, 23 it was anticipated 
that local educational agencies would/be the primary bene-
ficiaries of the funds appropriated under the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act. 24 In implementing its 
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assistance plan, however, Congress provided for payments 
to go to the respective states, rather than to the local 
educational agencies, 25 with the direction that the states 
distribute the appropriate amounts to the local education-
al agencies for which the latter qualify. 26 
Congress again made clear its intent to avoid assum-
ing the role as the primary sponsor of public education. 
Included in the language of the initial Act was a prohibi-
tion concerning the availability of aid funds under the 
Act similar to that found in subsection 205 (b) of the 
E . 0 . A Th h"b" . d 27 conom1c pportun1ty ct. e pro 1 1t1on rea , 
No payments shall be made under this sub-
chapter for any fiscal year to a State which 
has taken into consideration payments under 
this subchapter in determining the eligibility 
of any local educational agency in that State 
for State aid, or the amount of that aid, with 
respect to the free public education of child-
ren during that year or the preceding fiscal 
year. 
No litigation has been found which has challenged 
directly the validity or effectiveness of the above-quoted 
provision. The language employed is clear, and lends it-
self to support the conclusion of the Hob-0on court that 
the statute is "manifestly intended to provide extraordi-
nary services as slum schools, not merely to compensate 
for inequalities produced by local school boards in favor 
of their middle-income schools. Thus, they [this Act and 
the other acts cited] cannot be regarded as curing any 
inequalities for which the Board is otherwise respon-
"bl 1128 s1 e. 
' -
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The Impact Areas .Aid Legislation 
Since neither the Economic Opportunity Act nor the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act has been the sub-
ject of litigation (except, as noted, in Rod~iguez v. San 
Antonio Independent School Vi-0t~ict, 29 in6~a) in which 
a reduction in state aid to local educational agencies 
resulted from agencies receiving federal assistance under 
the respective acts, it is the last reference given by 
the·Hob-0on court which proves most significant for pur-
poses of this study. The impact aid legislation cited in 
the appropriate footnote in Hob-0on 30 is Subchapter I, 
Assistance for Local Educational Agencies in Areas Af-
fected by Federal Activity, of Chapter 13, Financial As-
sistance to Local Educational Agencies, of Title 20, 
Education, of the United States Code. 
In its declaration of policy for Subchapter I, Con-
gress stated that the nature of the funds provided by the 
impact aid legislation was that of assistance. Further, 
it recognized four sources of financial burden on local 
educational agencies which it felt should be addressed. 31 
In recognition of the responsibility of 
the United States for the impact which certain 
Federal activities have on the local education-
al agencies in the areas in which such activi-
ties are carried on, the Congress declares it 
to be the policy of the United States to pro-
vide financial assistance (as set forth in this 
subchapter) for those local educational agen-
cies upon which the United States has placed 
financial burdens by reason of the fact that-
. . 
(1) the revenues available ~o such agen-
cies from local sources have been reduced as 
the result of the acquisition of .real property 
by the United States; or 
(2) such agencies provide education for 
children residing on Federal property; or 
(3) such agencies provide education for 
children whose parents are employed on Federal 
property; or 
(4) there has been a sudden and substan-
tial increase in school attendance as the re-
sult of Federal activities. 
Again, the language "to provide financial assis-
tance1132 appears, as it did in the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act. 33 It can be assumed that by such 
language Congress intended the aid to take the form of 
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money payments, but, perhaps more importantly, the use of 
the word "assistance" indicates that, as in the two federal 
statutes considered previously, Congress was not attempt-
ing to assume primary responsibility for funding public 
education. 
There are two major distinctions, however, between 
the impact aid legislation, on the one hand, and the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act and the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, on the other. First, under the Economic 
Opportunity Act, the director of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity was authorized to mak~ grants to or to con-
tract with both local agencies and states to pay part or 
all of the costs of community action programs. 34 Under 
the provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, the Commissioner of Education was directed to make 
. 35 
payments due under the Act to the states. Congress, 
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however, directed that amounts due under Subchapter I, 
Assistance for Local Educational Agencies in Areas Affec-
ted by Federal Activity, were to be paid by the Commis-
tioner of Education directly to the local educational 
agency affected by the federal activity. 36 
The Commissioner shall, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (c) [Adjustments where 
necessitated by appropriations] of this section, 
from time to time pay to each local educational 
agency, in advance or otherwise, the amount 
which he estimates such agency is entitled to 
receive under this subchapter .... 
The second major distinction of the impact areas aid 
as interpreted by the Hob~on court in 1967 is the lack of 
a specific statement prohibiting the use of impact aid 
funds as "general aid" to the local educa~ional agencies 
involved. It will be recalled that subse~tion 205 (b) of 
the Economic Opportunity Act provided, "No grant or con-
tract authorized under this part may provide for general 
aid to elementary or secondary education in any school or 
school sys'tem." Further, Congress made it clear in the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act that state aid 
should in no way be reduced by reference to the aid provi-
ded in the Act. 37 
When the Hob~on court read the impact aid legislation, 
and included it along with the other two statutory assis-
tance schemes in its opinion, however, there was no sirni-
lar prohibitory clause in the impact aid statute. It is 
significant, therefore, that by judicial interpretation 
alone (recognizing the similarity in the congressional 
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declarations of purpose), and not by specific statutory 
prohibition, impact aid funds as early as 1967 were held 
to be "manifestly intended to provide extraordinary ser-
vices at the slum schools, not merely to compensate for 
inequalities produced by local school boards in favor of 
their middle-income schools. 1138 When the special role of 
the local school board (the provision of public education 
in the District of Columbia) considered b·r the Hob~on 
court is recalled, perhaps it becomes justifiable to sub-
stitute "states" into the above language in place of "lo-
cal school boards." Even if such an interpretation extends 
the meaning of the Hob~on language beyond that intended by 
the court, the fact that the court was willing to join the 
impact aid legislation with the Economic Opportunity Act 
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act for pur-
poses of construing the use to which the federal funds 
provided could be put is significant in light of the ab-
sence in the impact areas aid legislation of the prohibi-
tory clause found in the latter two programs. 
Subsequent to the Hob~on decision, a stream of liti-
gation was heard in federal courts challenging the inter-
pretation that impact areas aid could not be used to 
provide general assistance to public education. For a 
period of time, the courts had to interpret the same 
statutory language as faced the Hob~on court in 1967. It 
was not until the last quarter of 1968 that Congress amen-
ded Subchapter I to include a prohibition against funds 
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being provided local edu~ational agencies in states reduc-
ing state aid to local educational agencies because those 
agencies had received Subchapter I funds. 39 
Attention must now be directed to th1! litigation 
subsequent to Hob-0on, both before and after the 1968 
amendment, to determine the judicial response to reduc-
tions in state aid to local educational agencies as a 
consequence of those agencies receiving federal impact 
areas aid funds. The final series of cases of signifi-
cance to this study all involve Subchapter I, Chapter 13, 
Title 20 (impact aid) funds. The legislation is often 
referred to by the courts by its Public Law number, 874. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT AREAS AID CASES 
The initial decision concerning the inclusion of Sub-
chapter I (impact areas aid) funds in a state scheme of 
educational financing, with a resultant reduction in state 
aid to local educational agencies, set the tone for all of 
the subsequent decisions in this area. Since it is cited 
at length by subsequent courts, and presents a number of 
the arguments advanced by both sides in these controver-
sies, it is appropriate to examine this case in some de-
tail. 
Shepheard v. Godwin (1968) 
Th~ plaintiffs in Shephea~d v. Godwin 1 were real 
estate owners and taxpayers of the City of Norfolk, and 
were later joined in the suit by those of the County of 
Fairfax. The defendants were state officials charged with 
the responsibility and duty of distributing the public 
moneys appropriated for schools by the Virginia legisla-
ture. Under attack in the case was the state's formula 
for providing state assistance to local school districts. 
At the beginning of the 1948-49 school term, Virginia 




State School Aid Fund was established to take care of the 
program's costs. The minimum program cost, a minimum 
amount which each subdivision had to spend each year for 
its schools, was,computed by adding I) the amount of in-
stitutional salaries when reckoned by a state formula for 
each teacher position, and 2) "the average daily atten-
dance (ADA) multiplied by $100 in 1966-68 ($80 in 1964-66) 
per pupil. 113 
The state contribution for each subdivision consisted 
of two items: (1) a basic State share and (2) a supple-
mentary State share. The basic State share amounted to 60 
per cent of the instructional salaries. The supplementary 
State share was computed by subtracting from the minimum 
program cost4 
(1) the basic State share; 
(2) an amount equivalent to a uniform tax levy 
of 60 cents per $100 of true values of lo-
cal taxable real estate and public service 
corporation property in the subdivision; 
and 
(3) 50% (in 1966-68) of the impact funds receiv-
able by the subdivision from the Federal 
government for operating costs. 
The plaintiffs in the case were attacking the deduction 
described in (3) above from the supplementary State share 
of the state's contribution to the local school district 
"as violative of the purpose and intent of Congress and 
as transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment. 115 
The Shephea~d court directed its attention immediate-
ly to the purpose of Congress' providing the aid funds. 6 
The act makes these propositions clear: 
(1) the Federal funds are exclusively for sup-
plementation of the local sources of revenues 
for school purposes; and (2) the act was not 
intended to lessen the efforts of the State. 
For support for these conclusions the court drew on two 
. . 7 statutory prov1s1ons, 
... that the Federal contribution be paid 
directly to the local school agency on reports 
of the local school agency, and that the com-
putation be computed by reference to the ex-
penditures 'made from revenues derived from 8 
local sources' in comparable school districts. 
It is significant to note that the court did not examine 
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the declaration of purpose of 20 U.S.C. § 236, but turned 
directly to a consideration of the payees of the aid and 
the method of computation of the amount of the aid to 
draw its conclusions. 
The court then turned to a consideration of the leg-
islative history of the impact aid legislation. Noting 
estimates that Virginia's annual payments toward supple-
mentary aid would be increased by approximately ten mil-
lion dollars if the federal impact area aid funds were not 
deducted in the computation of the supplementary State aid 
share, the court refused to read the federal legislation 
as permitting such a windfall to the state as the then 
current state formula provided. 9 
In Report No. 2287, ... of the Committee on 
Education and Labor, dated June 20, 1950, 8lst 
Congress, 2d Session, the legislation which 
became P.L. 874 is explained in detail. The 
exposition underscores the Congressional man-
date that the impact payments are for local 
use and are not to be applied to compensate 
the State in any respect. Thus, at p. 13, it 
is stated: 'The effect of the payments provided 
for-in this section, is to compensate the local 
educational agency for loss in its loQal reve-
nues. Thehe i~ no QOmpen-0atlon ooh any lo-0-0 
in State hevenu.u. * * *' -(Accent added.) 
The fact that the payees of the aid funds w~re the 
local educational agencies thefuselves, rather than the 
states, permitted the court to reject a major contention 
of the defendants. Subchapter II, Assistance to Local 
Educational Agencies for the Education of Children of 
Low-Income Families, was initially enacted in 1965. 10 
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It will be recalled that Subchapter II contained a speci-
fic restriction on payments to states, and, through the 
states, to local educational agencies, which had11 
taken into consideration payments under this 
subchapter in determining the eligibility of 
any local educational agency in that State for 
State aid, or the amount of that aid, with re-
spect to the free public education of children 
during that year or the preceding fiscal year. 
Since Public Law 874, the impact areas aid legisla-
tion, was reenacted in 196512 as Subchapter I, Assistance 
for Local Educational Agencies in Areas Affected by Feder-
al Activity, in the same legislation that enacted Subchap-
ter II, but without a provision similar to the restriction 
on payments contained in Subchapter II, 13 
the defendants conclude that Congress did not 
intend to foreclose a State from taking into 
consideration Federal impact payments to a lo-
cality in determining State aid to a local 
school agency. 
The Shepheahd court rejected this contention, however, by 
observing the difference in payees under the two 
subchapters. The court urged a look14 
to the apparent reason the proviso was included 
in Title [Subchapter] II. There the Federal 
moneys are paid directly to the State, and con-
sequently there was need for a direct admoni-
tion against its use by the State. Under Title 
[Subchapter] I, as we have already noted, the 
moneys are paid to the locality and not to the 
State, and there was no apparent reason to in-
clude any restriction upon the State. More-
over, the omission from P.L. 874 originally, 
or as reenacted, would seem to imply that no 
touch, direct or indirect, of the money by 
the State was even remotely possible. 
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The Shephea~d court appeared to be painting its deci-
sion with a rather broad brush. Nowhere in its opinion 
did the court refer to the congressional declaration of 
policy of Subchapter I, found in 20 U.S.C. § 236, in which 
is found the language, ". . the Congress declares it to 
be the policy of the United States to provide financial 
assistance for those local educational agencies .. II 
Rather, the court looked primarily to the question, "Who 
were the payees of the aids funds?" (and, in passing, to 
the method of computation of the amount of the aid) to 
conclude that the state may not touch the funds provided. 
In 1966, Congress adopted what is currently 20 U.S.C. 
15 
§ 240 (d) (1), an amendment to Subchapter I. 
The amount which a local educational agency 
in any State is otherwise entitled to receive 
under section 237, 238, or 239 of this title for 
any fiscal year shall be reduced in the same pro-
portion (if any) that the State has reduced for 
that year its aggregate expenditures (from non-
Federal sources) per pupil for current expendi-
ture purposes for free public education (as 
determined pursuant to regulations of the Com-
missioner) below the level of such expenditures 
per pupil in the second preceding fiscal year. 
The Commissioner may waive or reduce this 
reduction whenever in his judgment excep-
tional circumstances exist which would make 
its application inequitable and would defeat 
the purpose of this subchapter. 
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The Shepheand court quoted the above amendment, as well as 
a House of Representatives committee report on the amend-
t . d f . 1 . 16 men, as ev1 ence o congress1ona intent. 
The House of Representatives Committee Report 
No. 1814, dated August 5, 1966, in proposing 
an amendment to P.L. 874 stated: 
'Fifteen States offset the amount of Pub-
lic Law 874 funds received by their school dis-
tricts by reducing part of their State aid to 
those districts. Thl-0 i-0 in di~eQt QOnt~aven-
tion to QOngne-0-0ional intent. Impact aid funds 
are intended to compensate districts for loss 
of tax revenues due to Federal connection, not 
to substitute for State funds the districts 
would otherwise receive. 
'The committee understands that it is ad-
ministratively unfeasible, if not impossible, 
to determine adjusted allotments to those States 
already following this practice. However, to 
prevent its occurrence in the future, we pro-
pose an amendment which would reduce Public 
Law 874 eligibility in proportion to any State 
reduction in aggregate per pupil expenditures.' 
(Accent added.) 
The holding striking down the reductions in state aid 
as provided by the supplementary State share scheme of 
Virginia followed. Since the congressional intent was 
found from the language of the statute and congressional 
committee reports to be to provide assistance to local 
school districts and to by-pass, for purposes of Subchap-
ter I, the states, the court's conclusion was inescapable. 
It is important to note, however, that the court was not 
concerned with stated declaration of purpose of Congress; 
rather, it was concerned with the evidence of that purpose 
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as expressed in statutory language designating payees and 
providing methods of computation of the federal aid to 
which each local educational agency was entitled, and in 
congressional committee reports. Apparently, this court 
would have reached the same conclusion had there been no 
20 U.S.C. § 236 declaration of purpose in force, since the 
court did not rely on that section at all. Nevertheless, 
where and when the court did find congressional intent, it 
was held to control and supersede a state school financing 
plan in conflict therewith. 
It can be argued, therefore, that the Shepheand court 
took the long way around the case to reach its decision. 
Nevertheless, the court's order was inescapable in light 
of its approach to the attempted reduction in state aid to 
local school districts as a consequence of those districts 
17 receiving Subchapter I funds. 
[T]he court for the reasons stated in 
its opinion filed herewith finds, and adjudges 
and orders as follows: ... 
4. That the defendants and their successors 
in office be, and each of them is hereby, re-
strained and enjoined from hereafter in any 
manner enforcing or effectuating [the specific 
Virginia statutory provisions under considera-
tion] insofar as this legislation directs or 
requires a deduction to be made in the compu-
tation of State aid to local public schools 
of Virginia based on, or in consideration of, 
any part of the moneys payable to, or for the 
benefit of, such local schools by the United 
States of America under and by virtue of Pub-
lic Law 874, 81 Cong., 2d Session, approved 
September 30, 1950, 64 Stat. 1100~ 20 U.S.C. 
§ 236 et. seq., as amended, (Supp. II 1965-
1966), ... 
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Thqs was the tone set for a series of decision chal-
lenging reductions. in state aid under circumstances simi-
lar to those found in Shephea4d. Other decisions followed 
quickly. On September 30, 1968, a federal district court 
spoke again on this topic, not unmindful of the precedent 
established in Shephea4d v. Gadwin. 18 
Hergenreter v. Hayden (1968) 
The doctrine of Shephea4d v. Gadwin19 was not success-
fully challenged in the second of the Subchapter I cases; 
on the other hand, it was rather significantly expanded. 
The extension of the developing law to be found in He4gen-
4ete4 v. Hayden 20 must be construed as being of both de-
gree and substance. 
The plaintiffs in He4gen4ete4 were residents and tax-
payers of Kansas School District No. 437, an impact area 
adjacent to Forbes Air Force Base, Topeka. These plain-
tiffs challenged the legality of action taken by defendant 
state school officials in establishing a formula and allo-
cating state aid to be given Kansas school dist~icts under 
the Kansas School Foundation Act. 21 Specifically, certain 
provisions of the statute required "that twenty-five per-
cent of the total amount of federal impact funds received 
by an eligible district be deducted from the amount of 
"d h. d d" . 1122 state ai to sue impacte 1str1ct. It will be ob-
served that the deduction of twenty-five percent of the 
Subchapter I funds in the instant case is less than the 
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fifty percent deduction required by the Virginia legisla-
tion overturned in Shepheand. Thus, Kansas School Dis-
trict No. 437 here complained of a lesser loss than did 
the plaintiffs in Shepheand. 
The court in Hengenneten was faced with the same 
issue as the Shepheand court, but phrased its concern more 
succintly. While the Shepheand court talked around the 
supremacy clause, but ultimately used a conflict between 
congressional intent and state statutory language as the 
basis of its holding, the Hengenneten court formulated its 
issue in such a way as to deal with the primary issue 
d . l 23 1rect y. 
Does the State School Foundation Act as 
found in K.S.A.1967 Supp. 72-7001, et seq., 
specifically sections 72-7005 and 72-7010, con-
flict, in such a way as to make the state act 
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, with United 
States P.L. 874, as found in 20 U.S.C.A. 236, 
et seq., specifically section 238(c) (1) be-
cause of the fact that the state Foundation 
Act takes into account the federal funds re-
ceived by a school district under se~tion 238(c) 
(1) of 20 U.S.C.A. in determining the amount 
of state aid such district is to receive? 
Where Shepheand had discussed conflicts between congres-
sional intent and the Virginia statutory provisions, Hen-
genneten left no doubt that, should a conflict between the 
congressional act and the Kansas statutory provision be 
found, the latter would fall under the supremacy clause. 
In order to understand what is apparently a signifi-
cant change in judicial philosophy from that expressed in 
previous cases discussed, it would be worth recalling the 
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holding of the court in Qui~k v. Spning6ield TownJhip. 24 
There the court was faced with state legislation requiring 
the congressional township fund to be taken into account 
when distribution was made of state aid to local school 
districts. The court did not find that such a considera-
tion of federal funds amounted to a state's use of those 
funds, such a use being prohibited under the holding of 
State v. Spning6ield Town-0hip. 25 The Qui~k v. Spning6ield 
26 Town-0hip court observed, 
There is certainly a material difference be-
tween taking away what one has, and the refus-
al to give him more. 
The point of the opinion was that the funds provided to 
the local inhabitants of a township for the support of 
their schools were not being touched; the state aid funds 
were to be considered separate and distinct from the con-
gressional township fund, even though the amount of the 
former was predicated on the amount of the latter. 
The Hengenneten court refused to make such a distinc-
27 tion, and went right to the point of the supremacy clause. 
We think it is clear upon the law and the evi-
dence that the State of Kansas is tampering 
with the distribution of federal funds contrary 
to Congressional intent expressed in P.L. 874, 
and hence is in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution, Arti-
cle VI, Clause 2 .... The admitted purpose 
of the Kansas legislature, no matter how laud-
able its end in aiding education in federal 
impact areas, was to substitute state judgment 
for federal judgment, as reflected in the state 
statutes considered here. No matter how salu-
tary the state legislation, it must give way 
under the Supremacy Clause. 
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The court in the instant case observed-that by appli-
cation of the state formula, federal aid moneys were being 
qistributed state-wide. 28 
[W]e do not have to speculate under the evidence 
that a portion of the federal money given to 
School District No. 437 was indirectly taken 
away, withheld and distributed elsewhere among 
the school districts of Kansas. In the light 
of Stipulation of Fict No. 8, a verj substan-
tial sum was redistributed by bookkeeping 
credits for each of the last two fiscal years. 
Defendants' Exhibit C confirms that statewide 
diminution of federal funds in every impact 
district. 
It is apparent from the above language that any amount 
saved by the State of Kansas by reducing its aid to an im-
pact area district becau&e of the presence of Subchapter I 
funds was subsequently being redistributed to other local 
educational agencies around the state. First, it will be 
recalled that the Virginia scheme overturned in Shepheand 
v. Godwin 29 provided for the state moneys so saved to be 
returned to the state's general treasury~ Thus, an exten-
sion of the Shepheand holding was made by the Hengenneten 
court. Second, the overturning of the state-wide redis-
tribution scheme in Hengenneten comports with the holding 
of State v. Spning6ietd Town-0hip 1 30 which refused to allow 
funds granted to inhabitants of a congressional township· 
to be used by the school system of the State of Indiana at 
large. 
The Hengenneten court, while extending in both degree 
and substance the Shepheand decision, relied heavily on 
what it termed31 
the excellent reasoning and holdin~ in Shep-
heard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869, . . ; where 
similar - but not identical - Virginia school 
fund legislation was held unconstitutional on 
the basis of violation of both the Supremacy 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Particularly did the instant court look to Shephea~d for 
guidance regarding the congressional intent of the Sub-
chapter I funds. 32 
As stated in Shepheard v. Godwin, supra, the 
federal statute was intended by Congress to 
supplement local funds, not substitute for 
them .... We have made independent research 
... and believe, with the Virginia Federal 
Court in Shepheard v. Godwin, supra, that the 
House of Representatives Committee Report No. 
1814, dated August 5, 1966, in propo?ing an 
amendment to P.L. 874, makes it abundantly 
clear that state manipulation of these impact 
area funds is prohibited. 
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The significance in this language is that this court found 
state manipulation in the form of a reduction in state aid 
because of the receipt of federal funds, whereas the Indi-
ana supreme court in QuieR v. Sp~ing6ield Town~hip 33 had 
not. 
Finally, the court enjoined the defendants from en-
£ . h 1 . 1 . 34 arcing testate eg1s at1on 
insofar as this legislation directs or requires 
a deduction to be made in the computation of 
state aid to local public schools of Kansas 
based on, or in consideration of, any part of 
the moneys payable to, or for the benefit of, 
such local schools by the United States of 
America under and by virtue of [Subchapter I, 
Chapter 13, Title 20, United States Code]. 
The effect of the language employed in the court's order 
is potentially broader than that generated by the order 
in Shephea~d. It will be recalled that the order in 
I ' 
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Shepheand also concerned itself with ''moneys payable to, 
. 35 
or for the benefit of, such local schools ... " The 
Shepheand court, however, 1had consistently emphasized that 
payments under Subchapter I were to be made by the federal 
government directly to the local educational agencies; the 
states were to be by-passed. 
Hengenneten did not dweli on this federal statutory 
provision or point at all. To be sure, Subchapter I was 
the same as interpreted in both cases, but the instant 
court did not emphasize the identity of the payees as did 
the Shepheand court. Therefore, when Hengenneten employs 
language such as "moneys payable to, or for the benefit 
36 of, such local schools," perhaps it was less concerned 
with whether the state or the local educational agency was 
the payee than was Shepheand. There is no clear and con-
vincing language that such is the case in the Hengenneten 
opinion, but such a notion may serve to crack the door in 
any subsequent case where the local educational agency is 
not the payee of the federal aid funds. 
Douglas Independent School District 
No. 3 v. Jorgenson (1968) 
Vougla-0 Independent Schaal Vl-0tnlct No. 3 v. Jangen-
4on,37 decided less than two months after the Hengenneten 
decision was handed down, presented a cross between the 
fact situations of Shepheand and Hengenneten. The plain-
tiffs in the instant case were an impacted area school 
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district and a patron of the schools therein and a resident 
thereof, while, the defendants again were state officials 
charged with the responsibility and duty of distributing 
the public moneys appropriated for schools by the South 
Dakota legislature. Under attatk was the constitution-
ality of a state scheme providing state aid funds to local 
educational agencies. 
Like the corresponding Virginia statute construed in 
Shepheand, the South Dakota legislation38 challenged in 
VouglaJ Independent39 
dictated that the computation of the Founda-
tion Formula Funds under SDC 1960 Supp. 15.2246 
must consider fifty percent (50%) of the funds 
received by a school district under the pro-
visions of Public Law 874, subsection 3(c) (1) 
as part of the income of the foundation pro-
gram of the school district. 
In 1968 the South Dakota legislature increased to seventy-
five percent [75%] the amount of Subchapter I funds to be 
offset against the amount of state aid to which an impact 
area school district would otherwise have been entitled. 40 
Like the corresponding Kansas statute construed in Hengen-
neten, the South Dakota legislation provided funds saved 
by the state by application of the statute were to be dis-
bursed to all school districts of the state. It will be 
recalled that under the Virginia plan the moneys saved by 
the state were returned to the state's general fund. 
The instant court rejected the notion that the above 
difference in the use to which the moneys saved by the 
state were to be put was sufficient to distinguish the two 
( 
f . . . 41 act s1tuat1ons. 
This court feels that the finding of the 
Shephea~d court that 874 f~nds are a supple-
ment for local revenues and not a substitute 
is correct, ~nd also'that the Shephea~d case 
is directly in point with the present case. 
The court rejected also the defendants' ,contention that 
Virginia's use of the funds saved by apilication of the 
state statute was more offensive to the rights of impact 
area school districts than was the use outlined in the 
South Dakota statutory provisions. 42 
It is the finding of this Court that what the 
State of South Dakpta does with funds uncon-
stitutionally withheld from impacted area dis-
tricts is immaterial and the fact that the 
money is withheld is sufficient to substantiate 
the plaintiffs' claim that their rights have 
been violated. 
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The Vougla¢ Independent court returned to the pat-
tern begun in Shephea~d, and emphasized that local educa-
tional agencies were the payees of the funds provided by 
Subchapter I. 43 
It should be pointed out that the moneys given 
for Federal aid are given to the local districts 
and are meant to be distributed by the local 
districts and are not meant in any way to be 
in lieu of State aid. 
The instant court found support for this position in a 
statement by the She.phe.a~d court, "Federal children are 
to a large extent paying their own way so far as the State 
is concerned, 1144 and Congressional Committee Report No. 
2287 45 outlining the reasons for the states not being 
permitted. to participate in the distribution of Subchapter 
I aid funds. That no state should reduce state aid in 
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light of Subchapter I aid funds from 'the federal govern-
ment to local districts, the court found, was evidenced 
by the House of Representatives Committee -Report No. 1814, 
dated August 5, 1966, in proposing the 1966 amendment to 
Subchapter I, which amendment is now 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) 
(1). This report was the same one quoted on the same 
point by the court in Shephea~d. 
The final order of the Vougla-0 Independent court 
substantially paralleled the orders of Shephea~d and He~-
gen~ete~, invalidating state legislation46 
insofar as this legislation directs or requires 
a deduction to be made in the computation of 
State aid to local public schools based on, 
or in consideration of, any part of the moneys 
payable to, or for the benefit of such local 
schools by the United States of America under 
and by virtue of [Subchapter I, Chapter 13, 
Title 20, United States Code]. 
While the instant case does not expand to a great degree 
the holdings of Shephea~d and He~gen~ete~, it does return 
to a consideration of the designated payees of Subchapter 
I aid funds, and affirmatively holds that there is no le-
gal difference in the two previously construed alterna-
tives concerning the use of the moneys saved by the states 
under their respective statutes. Finally, the court did 
agree, along with the Virginia and Kansas federal district 
courts, that Subchapter I aid funds were a supplement to 
local revenues rather than a substitute for state aid to 
which the local school districts may otherwise be entitled. 
Carlsbad Union School District of San 
Diego County v. Rafferty 
(1969, 1970) 
No new ground was tilled in the fourth decided case 
dealing with Subchapter I federal aid funds. Canl-0baa 
Union Sehool Vi-0tniet 06 San Viego County v. Ra 00 enty47 
was complicated to a minor extent by the amendment of 
Subchapter I to include what is currently 20 U.S.C. § 
240 (d) (2). 
98 
The case's plaintiffs were impacted school districts 
which qualified for Subchapter I funds and resident tax-
payers thereof, while the defendants included, among 
others, the Honorable Max Rafferty, California Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction. The court was faced with de-
termining the validity under the federal supremacy clause 
of the California scheme of school aid called the Founda-
tion Program. 48 
This program consists of 'Basic Aid,' 'District 
Aid,' and 'Equalization Aid.' Basic aid is re-
quired by the state constitution. It is compu-
ted according to the average daily attendance 
(ADA) of students within the various districts. 
District Aid is based upon the assessed valua-
tion of property within the districts. Equali-
zation Aid is an additional form of aid payable 
to the districts if the amount of Basic Aid and 
District Aid for any district is less than the 
amount of the Foundation Program computed for 
that district. It is the Equalization Aid that 
concerns us here. 
Certain statutory provisions in force in California 
provided for a reduction by approximately twenty-five 
99 
percent, of state Equalization Aid going to a school dis-
trict receiving Subchapter I f~nds. 49 It was the conten-
tion of the plaintiffs 50 
(1) that the state statutes are repugnant to 
federal law and, therefore, must fall in the 
face of the Supremacy Clause, Art. 6, Cl. 2; 
and 
(2) that the statutes violate the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and are, therefore, unconstitutional. 
The plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim was dismissed by a 
three-judge federal panel, and the case as appealed was 
decided on the basis of the plaintiffs' first contention, -
i.e., a violation of the supremacy clause resulted in the 
b . . 1 · d 51 state statutes e1ng 1nva 1 . 
It is necessary at this point to digress in time, and 
to examine the 1968 amendment to Subchapter I. On 
October 16, 1968 (after the Shephea~d and He~gen~ete~ 
decisions had been rendered, and little more than a month 
before the Vougla-0 Independent decision was handed down), 
Congress enacted what is currently 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) 
(2).52 
No payments may be made during any fiscal 
year to any local educational agency in any 
State which has taken into consideration pay-
ments under this subchapter in determining the 
eligibility of any local educational agency 
in that State for State aid (as defined by regu-
lation), or the amount of that aid, with respect 
to free public education during that year or 
the preceding fiscal year, or which makes such 
aid available to local educational agencies in 
such a manner as to result in less State aid 
to any local educational agency which is eli-
gible for payments under this subchapter than 
such local educational agency would receive 
if it were not so eligible. 
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At the time of the Ca~l-0bad decision, the California· 
- 5 3 . 
legislature was in session, and the defendants asked the 
court to read the late 1968 amendment as sanctioning the 
reduction in Equalization Aid to impact area school dis-
tricts as a consequence of those districts receiving Sub-
chapter I funds for all years prior to the effective time 
of the amendment. The undisbursed sum being held under 
the court's restraining order for the 1968-69 fiscal year 
amounted to 16 million dollars. 54 The defendants did con-
cede that the 1968 amendment 55 
prohibits the State from taking into account 
during the 1969-70 fiscal year (beginning after 
July 1969) or thereafter, funds received by 
local school districts pursuant to Pub.L. No. 
81-874 for the purpose of computing or appor-
tioning state aid to public schools. They also 
acknowledge the validity of the holdings in th56 
three district court cases preceding this one. 
It is interesting to note that the California offi-
cials conceded the validity of the holding in Vougla-0 
Independen~, which prohibited the kind of deduction for 
which they were arguing, even though the Vougla-0 Inde-
penden~ decision was handed down November 26, 1968, and 
the amendment behind which they sought protection for 
their reduction in state aid was approved October 16, 1968. 
The instant court did not report how the defendants argued 
that their reduction in state aid should have been per-
mitted, whereas South Dakota's was prohibited in a con-
cededly correct decision, when both the Ca~l-0bad 
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and Vougla~ Independent decisions were rendered subsequent 
to the enactment of 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) (2). 
Quoting the 1966 House of Representatives Committee 
Report Number 1814 of August 5, 1966, as had all three 
previous federal district courts, the instant court re-
jected the 57 
novel theory that a stay or legal vacuum was 
intended by Congress because it fixed the dead-
line for prohibition of all federal aid to im-
pacted areas at a determinable future date ... 
While Pub.L. No. 90-576 does set the outer 
limit by which time reductions in state aid 
must stop, it does not say, or imply, that 
Congress intended to foreclose the states from 
initiating earlier reforms or the courts from 
enjoining further reductions. 
The Canl~bad court then adopted the holdings of 
Shepheand, Hengenneten, and Vougla~ Independent as its 
58 own. 
As to the Supiemacy Clause claim, this 
court concurs with and adopts the legal reason-
ing and holdings of the three district courts 
that have stricken down similar state legisla-
tion. 
The federal district court granted a permanent injunction 
to the plaintiffs prohibiting the state officials from 
implementing the state statutes which caused a reduction 
in the state's Equalization Aid to the impacted school 
districts because of the availability to any such district 
of Subchapter I federal aid. 
Probably because of the passage of the 1968 amendment 
to Subchapter I referred to above, Canl~bad was the only 




- 59 appealed to a United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, 
/" 
however, the appellants, the California state officials, 
made a number of concessions which serve to summarize the 
development of this line of cases. In handing down its 
decision on July 28, 29, 1970, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed, 60 
The sole question presented to us on this 
appeal is a narrow one. The appellants do not 
now argue that the judge was wrong in finding 
a conflict between the state statutes and Pub-
lic Law 874. On the contrary, they concede 
that the statutes do conflict, and that the 
decisions to that effect in Shepheard v. God-
win, E.D.Va., 1968, 280 F.Supp. 869, Douglas 
Independent School District No. 3 v. Jorgen-
son, D.S.D.1968, 293 F.Supp. 849 and Hergen-
reter v. Hayden, D.Kan. 1968, 295 F.Supp. 251, 
are correct. They do not claim that this is 
not a proper class action. They do not claim 
legal inability to comply with the judgment. 
They do not claim that the question should have 
been decided by a three-judge court rather than 
by a single judge. Their sole contention is 
that, by enacting Title III, section 305 of 
Public Law 90-576, the Congress relieved them 
of the liability here asserted, which is limited 
to aid that should have been paid during the 
fiscal year 1968- 69. . . . 
It is apparent, and the appellants concede, 
that one purpose of section 305 of Public Law 
90-576 was to put teeth into what was already 
the law, that a state could not reduce its aid 
to impacted districts because they w~re receiv-
ing aid under Public Law 81-874. The teeth 
are big ones. One obvious purpose of subsec-
tion (b) of section 305 is to hold back the 
bite of those teeth until the state legisla-
tures could have a chance to change their laws 
so as to eliminate their unlawful features. 
The appellate court refused to read the prohibition 
against Subchapter I aid being given to districts in 
states described in the 1968 amendment as sanctioning a 
reduction in state aid prior to the effective date of the 
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amendment. In affirming the decisi~n of the district 
court granting an injunction .against the California state 
officials implementing the state legislation for the 1968-
69 fiscal year, the court noted, 61 
If Congress had wished to do more than postpone 
· the effective date of the penalty imposed by 
subsection (a), and to wipe out the State's 
liability to the Districts, it could, and we 
think it would, have chosen much more apt lan-
guage to do so. Congress was well aware of 
the decision in Shepheard v. Godwin, 6up~a. 
See S.Rep. No. 1386, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 
(1968}. Nowhere in the legislative history 
is any disapproval of that decision expressed. 
It will be recalled that the parties in Ca~l6bad 
agreed at the district court level that the 1968 amendment 
was effective to prohibit a reduction in state aid to 
local school districts because of the availability of Sub-
chapter I funds for years beginning with the 1969-70 fis-
cal year in California. The validity of the 1968 
amendment has not been challenged in the reported cases, 
and the existence of the amendment is, no doubt, the rea-
son for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ca~l6bad being the 
final decision, in point of time, to examine at length the 
. d "d . 62 Sh h d H .t issue un er cons1 erat1on. ep ea~, e~gen~e e~, 
Vougla6 Independen.t, and the district court in Ca~l6bad 
had all found a conflict between Subchapter I and the 
respective state statutes, and each court had held the 
supremacy clause to require invalidation of the state pro-
vision in favor of implementing the intent of the federal 
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legislation. These cases made an aitack on the 1968 
amendment to Subchapter I useless litigation. 
' 
To the same effect as the four district court deci-
sions already discussed was a final case, in6ha, handed 
down after the Canl4bad distri~t court decision but before 
the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of that decision. The 
language employed in the final case in this line is in 
some respects the broadest of any of the five cases herein 
discussed, and, therefore, is perhaps the most significant 
to any future litigation in this area. 
Triplett v. Tiemann (1969) 
T · 0 .,...,.. T · 63 · 1 d h 11 . b N b h~p~e~~ v. ~emann · 1nvo ve a ca enge y e -
raska school districts to the constitutionality rif the 
Nebraska scheme for providing state aid to local educa-
tional agencies. Specifically, the statute provided for 
aid by the state to all of its public schools in order to 
supplement local revenues, and then required that credit 
or 4eduction be made as to this general supplementation 
of payments received by any school district under Subchap-
ter r. 64 The plaintiffs alleged that this scheme violated 
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 
At the outset, the court noted the various consequen-
65 ces of the state funding program on Subchapter I funds. 
This constituted in effect an absorption of 
the federal funds into the scheme of .state aid; 
made these funds have the status or equivalence 
of the general aid payments which were being 
provided to all school districts; and hence 
deprived the funds of their federal purpose 
and significance as special local assistance 
payments for federal impact. 
It is rather ironic that all five federal district 
courts which heard similar challenges to state statutes 
requiring a reduction in state aid to local s~hool dis-
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tricts receiving Subchapter I funds declared those stat-
utes invalid under the supremacy clause because they did 
not comport to the intent Congress had for the Subchapter 
I moneys, but only the Tniplett court, the last of the 
five to hear such a challenge, cited the section of Sub-
chapter I entitled "Congressional declaration of policy" 
. h . 66 h . f d as its aut ority. Te instant court oun "magic lan-
guage" in the words of the federal statute itself. 67 
The object of Congress had been, as 20 
U.S.C. § 236 declared, 'to provide financial 
assistance*** for those local edu:ational 
agencies upon which the United States has placed 
financial burdens by reason of [etc.] * * *'. 
In undertaking to make this special assistance 
have a different financial significance to a 
local school district than that for which Con-
gress had provided, the Nebraska statute must 
be held to constitute an interference with the 
operation and object of the federal statute and 
so to be violative of the Supremacy Clause. 
While not ignoring the language of the House of Rep-
resentatives Committee Report No. 1814 (1966) on the pro-
68 posed 1966 amendment to Subchapter I and the language 
69 of the 1968 amendment to Subchapter I, both of which 
had been cited by a number of the four previous decisions 
in this line of cases, Tniplett emphasized the role of 
the federal statutory language itself in determining 
congressional intent. 70 
Here, as indicated, the purpose and nature 
of the federal payments involved were made clear 
on the face of the federal statute. They were 
intended to provide special assistance to 'local 
educational agencies' for federal impact. 
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Accordingly, this court joined the Shepheand, Hengen-
neten, Vougla¢ Independent, and Canl~bad courts in en-
joining the defendant state board of education and state 
ff . . l 71 O lCla S 
from using or giving effect to the federal pay-
ments which have been or will be made to the 
plaintiff school districts and to other Neb-
raska school districts under [Subchapter I], 
as a credit or basis for reduction in the amount 
of the state-aid funds under Neb.R.S.Supp.1967, 
§§ 79-1330 to 79-1344 to which such school dis-
tricts would otherwise be entitled. 
The Subchapter I cases thus ended where they probably 
should have begun in the attempt to determine congression-
al intent: in the language of the federal statute it-
self.72 That is where the Indiana supreme court looked 
in the congressional township fund litigation, but the 
art had been lost in the national forest reserve and fed-
eral flood control litigation, no doubt, in part, due to 
the fact that congressional intent concerning the federal 
funds had not been expressed in the federal statutes. 
In the instant line of cases, all of the courts which 
considered the issue arrived at the same conclusion. It 
is suggested, however, that those courts which failed to 
look to the expressed intent of Congress as it appeared in 
the federal legislation took the long way in arriving at 
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the decision which a reading of the ''Congressional de-
claration of purpose'' allowed the Tniplett court to reach 
d . l 73 1rect y. It is to be hoped that in subsequent state 
aid to local educational agency cases involving federal 
legislation, the modµs operandi of Tniplett will be fol-
lowed. 
One Final Decision 
It is perhaps appropriate to bring this chapter to.a 
close with a case similar to that which opened the discus-
sion of Subchapter I funds. Hob~on v. Han~en 74 was pri-
marily a desegregation case which grouped together the 
Economic Opportunity Act, the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, and the impact areas aid legislation for 
purposes of determining the appropriate role of federal 
moneys provided by these three programs. Before any of 
the purely impact areas aid cases from Shepheand through 
Tniplett had been decided, Hob~on had held, 75 
[T]hese statutes are manifestly intended to 
provide extraordinary services at the slum 
schools, not merely to compensate for inequali-
ties produced by local school boards in favor 
of their middle-income schools. Thus, they 
cannot be regarded as curing any inequalities 
for which the Board is otherwise responsible. 
The Hob~on rationale was reaffirmed specifically in 
Rodniguez v. San Antonio Independent Sehool Vi~tniet. 76 
There suit was filed on behalf of Mexican-American school 
children and their parents who live4 in the Edgewood Inde-
pendent School District, and on behalf of all other 
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children throughout Texas who lived in school districts 
with low property valuations. Each district in the state 
was dependent upon federal, state, and local sources of 
financing. Since the federal government contributed only 
about ten percent of the overall public school expendi-
tures, however, most revenue was derived from local sources 
and the two state programs - the Available School Fund and 
the Minimum Foundation Program. On a statewide basis, 
twenty percent of the Minimum Foundation Program funds 
were derived from the local school districts through the 
levy of an ad valorem tax, but the percentage contribution 
borne by the local districts varied considerably from dis-
trict to district. In addition, the local property tax 
generated the revenue for payment of the bonded indebted-
ness for capital improvements as well as for all expendi-
b h . . 77 tures a ove t e statutory state m1n1mum. 
The plaintiffs contended that this system violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution because it discriminated on 
the basis of wealth. The market value of property per 
student in the seven San Antonio school districts varied 
from a low of 5,429 dollars in the Edgewood School Dis-
trict to a high of 45,095 dollars in the Alamo Heights 
School District. Although the local property taxes as a 
percent of the property's market value were highest in the 
Edgewood district and lowest in the Alamo Heights district 
(among the seven districts), Edgewood produced only 21 
\,. 
. ' . 
. dollars per pupil from ad valorem taxes.while Alamo 
Heights generated ~07 dollars per pupil from the same 
.. 
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source. State educational assistance programs were found 
to aggravate the problem rather than to tend to equalize 
available per pupil funds. 78 
Among the defenses raised in the district court by 
the San Antonio Independent School District and the other 
defendants was that the state could discriminate as it de-
sired so long as federal financing equalized the differ-
ences. In denying this contention, the court noted that 
"plaintiffs have successfully controverted the contention 
that federal funds do in fact compensate for state dis-
• • • 11 79 cr1m1nat1on. 
The court then directed its attention to the 1967 de-
cision of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 80 
More importantly, defendants have not adequate-
ly explained why the acts of other governmental 
units should excuse them from the discrimina-
tory consequences of state law. Hobson v. Han-
sen, 269 F.Supp. 401 at 496, countered defend-
ants' view by finding that the federal aid to 
education statutes '· .. are manifestly in-
tended to provide extraordinary services at 
the slum schools, not merely to compensate for 
inequalities produced by local school boards 
in favor of their middle-income schools. Thus, 
they cannot be regarded as curing any inequali-
ties for which the Board is otherwise responsi-
ble.' Since they were designed primarily to 
meet special needs in disadvantaged schools, 
these funds cannot be employed as a substitute 
for state aid without violating the Congres-
sional will. Further support for this view 
is offered by a series of decisions prohibiting 
deductions from state aid for 81istricts re-
ceiving 'impacted areas' aid. 
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The district court determined that the then current 
method of financing public education in Texas discrimina-
ted on the basis of wealth, and concluded, as a matter of 
law, that the plaintiffs were denied equal protection of 
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
S C . . 82 tates onst1tut1on. Subsequently, the decision of the 
district court was reversed. 83 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not have the opportunity to rule on the validity 
of the district court's determination concerning the role 
of federal funds provided to local school districts. 84 
While federal assistance has an ameliorat-
ing effect on the difference in school budgets 
between wealthy and poor districts, the Dis-
trict Court rejected an argument made by the 
State in that court that it should consider 
the effect of the federal grant in assessing 
the discrimination claim. 337 F.Supp. at 284. 
The State has not renewed that contention here. 
That the Hob~on and Rodhiguez district courts' con-
clusion that federal moneys are not to be construed as 
justifying otherwise unconstitutional discrimination is 
correct, however, was lent strong support in a footnote 
to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, in 
h . h M J . D 1 .. d . Rd . SS w 1c r. ustice oug as Joine , in o h~guez. 
Appellants made such a contention [i.e., 
that federal funds were used in such a way as 
to ameliorate significantly the widely vary-
ing consequences for Texas school districts 
and school children of the local property tax 
element of the state financing scheme] before 
the District Court but apparently have aban-
doned it in this Court. Indeed, data intro-
duced in the District Court simply belies the 
argument that federal funds have a significant 
equalizing effect .... And, as the District 
Court observed, it does not follow that remedial 
action by the Federal Government would.excuse 
any unconstitutional discrimi,nation effected 
by the state financing scheme. 377 F.Supp. 280, 
284. 
One Final Amendment 
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It would be inappropriate to conclude the discussion 
of the litigation involving Subchapter I funds without 
noting the most recent congressional amendment to the pro-
gram. While this last amendment has not yet been the sub-
ject of reported litigation, it directly affects 20 U.S.C. 
§ 240 (d) (2), the clause prohibiting Subchapter I funds 
from being paid to local educational agencies in states 
taking into consideration such payments in determining the 
eligibility of any local educational agency for state aid. 
In November, 1973, Congress amended Subchapter I to 
eliminate the application of 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) (2) in 
. . 86 certain c1rcums~ances. 
Section S(d) (2) of the Act of September 30, 
1950 (public Law 874, 81st Congress) [i.e., 20 
U.S.C. § 240 ('d) (2)], s'hall not operate to de-
prive any local educational agency of payments 
under such Act during the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1974, if such local educational agency 
is in a State which after June 30, 1972, has 
adopted a program of State aid for free public 
education which is designed to equalize expen-
ditures for education among local educational 
agencies in that State. This section shall be 
effective on and after July 1, 1973, and shall 
be deemed to have been enacted on June 30, 1973. 
By its own terms the 1973 amendment applied only to 
fiscal years ending June 30, 1974. Should its provisions 
be extended by Congress to include subsequent fiscal 
112 
years, however~ it is apparent that pursuant to a state 
plan to equalize expendit~res for educati?n among local 
educational agencies, such agencies will not be deprived 
' 
of Subchapter I funds-on account of those funds having 
been considered in formulating the plan. 
The 1973 amendment does not, of itself, alter the law 
of the holdings of the Subchapter I cases discussed in 
this chapter. Shephea~d and Hengenneten were decided 
prior to the adoption of 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) (2), and 
Vougla-0 Independent did not consider the subsection in 
its opinion. Canl-0bad made it clear that the subsection, 
while affecting the authority of the federal government 
to make Subchapter I payments in certain cases, did not 
affect the right (or lack thereof) of a state to reduce 
its aid commitment to a local educational agency because 
the latter had received Subchapter I funds. The 1973 
amendment appears merely to open the door.for continued 
Subchapter I payments in cases where, prior to the adop-
tion of the amendment, such payments would have been pro-
hibited, provided the necessary state plan has been 
implemented. It does not appear, in light of the Canl-0bad 
decision, to permit states to reduce state aid to local 
educational agencies receiving Subchapter I funds, even if 
the requisite state plan were adopted after June 30, 1972. 
When Congress enacted the 1973 amendment limiting the 
application of the 1968 amendment to Subchapter I, it is 
presumed to have known the effect of the pre-1968 amendment 
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case law. That the pre-1968 amendment case law (i.e., 
Shephea~d and Hengenneten), proh~biting a reduction in 
state aid to a local educational agency as a consequence 
-
of that agency receiving Subchapter I funds, is the law 
currently applicable to Subchapter I because of congres-
sional awareness of that case law at the time the 1973 
amendment was adopted is supported by the language of the 
Canl~bad circuit court of appeals. That court indicated 
that since Congress had not overruled the Shepheand de-
cision in or by the 1968 amendment, that case, i.e., 
Shepheand, could still serve as authority for prohibiting 
h d . . .d 87 sue a re uct1on 1n state a1 . 
Summary of Impact Aid Cases 
In dealing with Subchapter I, Assistance for Local 
Educational Agencies in Areas Affected by Federal Activi-
ty, of Chapter 13, Financial Assistance to Local Educa-
tional Agencies, of Title 20, Education, of the United 
States Code, courts have interpreted a statutory program 
containing a definite statement of congressional intent 
and policy concerning the moneys provided. Unlike the 
vague expressions of intent of the congressional township 
fund legislation and the absence of evidence of congres-
sional intent concerning the education funds of the 
national forest reserve and federal flood control legis-
lation, Congress, in 20 U.S.C. § 236, has expressed its 
intent to provide financial assistance to local educational 
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agencies upon which the United States has placed special 
financial burdens. 
The form of assistance provided by Subchapter I was 
found to be funds, as were ultimately provided in each of 
the other three federal programs previously discussed. 
Under Subchapter I, these funds were to be paid directly 
to the local educational agencies responsible for provid-
ing public education in the impacted areas. This feature 
corresponds somewhat to the congressional township fund 
legislation's grant to inhabitants of townships (with the 
fee interest, by court interpretation, in the township it-
self), and is in marked contrast to the national forest 
reserve and federal flood control provisions naming the 
states, as opposed to the local educational agencies, as 
the payees. 
Since the Subchapter I litigation dealt with alleged 
conflicts between federal and state statutory provisions, 
the source of the controlling law was found consistently 
to be federal and statutory, under the United States Con-
stitution's supremacy clause. These cases consistently 
found state statutes giving way to the conflicting, and 
overriding, federal provisions. 
Each of the cases discussed in this chapter reached 
the conclusion that a state could not reduce its state 
aid to a local educational agency below that to which it 
was otherwise entitled because that agency had received 
or was to receive Subchapter I federal funds. In reaching 
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this conclusion, Shepheand v. God~ln 88 relied heavily on 
the fact that the local_edu~atiorr~l agency was the desig-
' 
nated payee, and on language of a House of Representatives 
committee report indicating those states reducing their 
aid because of the availability of Subchapter I funds were 
violating congressional intent. Hengenneten v. Hayden 89 
reached its conclusion primarily by relying on Shepheand, 
while emphasizing the conflict between the federal and 
state statutory provisions involved. Vougla-0 Independent 
School Vl-0tnlct No. 3 v. Jongen-0on 90 returned to a consid-
eration of the local educational agency as the payee of 
Subchapter I funds, again finding a conflict between the 
federal and state statutes construed. 
Canl-0bad Union School Vl-0tnlct 06 San Vlego County v. 
Ra66e~ty91 distinguished the state's responsibility not to 
consider Subchapter I funds in its public education fund-
ing program and the authority of the federal government to 
withhold Subchapter I payments under the 1968 amendment. 
The amendment was held not to have affected a local educa-
tional agency's right to have its state aid computed with-
out regard to Subchapter I funds. 
Like the other four cases, Tnlplett v. Tlemann 92 
found a conflict between the intent of Congress in pro-
viding funds under Subchapter I and a state program re-
ducing aid to local educational agencies receiving 
Subchapter I funds. T~lplett was the only one of the de-
cisions, however, which went directly to the congressional 
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declaration of policy of Subchapter I to ~etermine con-
gressional intent. To that extent, Tniplett may serve as 
a model in future litigation involving federal aid to lo-
cal educational agencies. 
Two other decisions, Hob~on v. Han~en, 93 decided 
before Shepheand. and Rodn{guez v. San Antonio Independent 
School Vi~tnict, 94 decided after Tniplett, appeared to 
treat funds provided by the Economic Opportunity Act and 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as having the 
same purpose as those provided by Subchapter I. Neither 
case, however, dealt directly with the issue of whether 
a state could reduce its aid to a local educational agency 
as a consequence of that agency receiving funds under any 
or all of the three programs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EDUCATION REVENUE SHARING 
History of Education Revenue 
Sharing Proposals 
Education revenue sharing was proposed formally by 
President Richard M. Nixon on April 6, 1971. On that date 
he addressed a special message to Congress outlining his 
views concerning the federal government's role in financing 
public education, and proposing education revenue sharing 
as the program to accomplish the federal government's ob-
1 jectives in this area. President Nixon's April 6 propo-
sal was the last of six special revenue sharing measures 
(the others being in the fields of urban community develop-
ment, rural community development, transportation, man-
power training, and law enforcement assistance) submitted 
over a two month period 2 and designed to supplement gener-
1 h . 3 a revenues ar1ng. 
The President saw a federal responsibility in financ-
ing elementary and secondary education in three areas. 4 
This Federal role is threefold: ( 1) the allo-
cation of financial resources on a broad and 
continuing basis to help States and local school 
districts meet their responsibilities, (2) the 
provision of national leadership to help re-
form and renew our schools to improve performance, 
122 





concentration of resourtes to 
national 'probiems during the 
they are most intense~ 
.. 123 
The President emphasized in bis messa~e that the federal 
government's responsibility was not the primary responsi-
bility in public education funding~ however, and that his 
program was designed only to provide assistance to those 
with the primary responsibility. 5 
Primary responsibility, of course, rests 
with State and local governments, as it ·should. 
The Federal Government can help provide resources 
to meet rising needs, but State and local edu-
cation authorities must make the hard decisions 
about how to apply these resources in ways that 
best serve the educational needs of our child-
ren. To enable State and local authorities to 
do this more effectively, I am proposing today 
a new system of special revenue sharing as a 
means of providing Federal financial assistance 
for elementary and secondary education. 
The funds to be provided by President Nixon's pro-
posal were to have been directed to areas of "strong na-
tional interests. 116 
These funds would provide support for 
educational activities in broad areas where 
there are strong national interests in strength-
ening school programs. The national priority 
areas included are compensatory education for 
the disadvantaged, education of children af-
flicted by handicapping conditions, vocational 
education, assistance to schools in areas af-
fected by Federal activities, ~nd the provision 
of supporting services. 
Three weeks after the President's message had been 
sent to the Congress, legislation embodying his education 
revenue sharing plan was introduced in the House of 
Representatives by Congressman A. Quie (R-Minn.) 7 and in 




Committee on Education and Labor heard one day of testi-
mony on Congressman Quie's bill and the.Senate Subcommit-
tee on Education conducted three days of hearings on 
Senator Prouty's bill, but no further action was taken in 
. 9 
either House during the 92nd Congress. 
When the first session of the 93d Congress convened 
in 1973, President Nixon renewed his efforts to see edu-
cation revenue sharing enacted. On January 29, 1973,- the 
10 President submitted his annual budget message to Con-
gress in which he again called for passage of an education 
revenue sharing program while restating his view of the 
federal government's role in the field of public education 
f . 11 1nance. 
Outlays in the 1974 budget for education 
and manpower, including those for veterans, 
will be $12 billion. The 1974 program is based 
upon a reevaluation of the Federal Government's 
role in these areas. The primary responsibility 
for most of these activities, other than those 
for veterans, rests with State and local govern-
ments. The proper Federal role is primarily 
that of helping State and local governments 
finance their own activities, while conducting 
directly those few programs that can be done 
efficiently and effectively only by the Federal 
Government. 
The 1974 budget supports such a role for 
the Federal Government. It provides for: 
--creation of education and manpower reve-
nue sharing programs to give State and local 
governments greater power in allocating resources 
within these vital areas; .... 
Just over a month later, on March 1, 1973, President 
12 Nixon submitted to Congress a report on Human Resources, 
which he characterized as the "fourth section of my 1973 
13 State of the Union Message." In it he voiced a strong 
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plea for the ebactment of education revenue sharing in 
1973, the third year that such a proposal.had been before 
14 Congress. 
1973 must be a year of decisive action 
to restructure Federal aid programs for edu-
cation. Our goal is to provide continued Fed-
eral financial support for our schools while 
expanding State and local control over basic 
educational decisions. 
I shall again ask the Congress to estab-
lish a new program of Education Revenue Shar-
ing. This program would replace the complex 
and inefficient tangle of approximately 30 
separate programs for elementary and second-
ary education with a single flexible authority 
for use in a few broad areas such as compensa-
tory education for the disadvantaged~ education 
for the handicapped, vocational education, · 
needed assistance in federally affected areas, 
and supporting services. · 
Education Revenue Sharing would enlarge 
the opportunities for State and local decision-
makers to tailor programs and resources to 
meet the specific educational needs of their 
own localities. It would mean less red tape, 
less paper work, and greater freedom for those 
at the local level to do what they think is 
best for their schools--not what someone in 
Washington tells them is best. 
It would help to strengthen the principle 
of diversity and freedom in education that is 
as old as America itself, and would give edu-
cators a chance to create fresher, more indi-
vidual approaches to the educational challenges 
of the Seventies. At the same time, it would 
affirm and further the national interest in 
promoting equal educational opportunities for 
economically disadvantaged children. 
If there is any one area of human activity 
where decisions are best made at the local 
level by the people who know local conditions 
and local needs, it is in the field of primary 
and secondary education. I urge the Congress 
to join me in making this year, the third in 
which Education Revenue Sharing has been on 
the legislative agenda, the year when this 




On March 20, 1973, the administration's education 
revenue sharing bill was introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives by Congressman_A. Bell (R-Cal.) at the re-
. 15 
quest of the President. Known as the Better Schools Act 
of 1973, the bill was also introduced two days later in 
the Senate by Senator P. Dominick (R-Colo.), also by re-
quest.16 It is this bill which will be analyzed in great-
er detail in6~a. 
The introduction of the Better Schools Act of 1973 
was not received warmly in Congress. Representative A. 
Quie (R-Minn.), who in 1971 had himself introduced the 
President's first education revenue sharing program, com-
mented on March 23, 1973, just three days after H.R. 5823 
had been introduced, that the bill "doesn-' t stand a snow-
ball's chance in the warm place" of gettiHg through Con-
17 gress. Congressman W. Ford (D-Mich.) replied to 
Representative Quie, "It was worth coming down here to 
hear you say that," as House Education and Labor Committee 
Chairman C. Perkins (D-Ky.) conducted the Committee's ses-
. . L . · 11 18 s1on 1n OU1SV1 e. Congressman Perkins indicated at 
that time that he felt the administration would have been 
able to muster only 125 to 130 votes on the House floor 
for the Better Schools Act of 1973. 19 
For 1973, at least, Congressman Quie's prediction 
proved correct. As early as June 9, 1973, the Nixon ad-
ministration admitted defeat in its efforts to push edu-
cation revenue sharing through Congress in time for the 
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1973-74 school year. On that date, John Ottina, then the 
United States Commissioner of Education-designate, sent 
a letter to state school superintendents assuring them 
they would continue to receive federal aid grants in 1973-
74 despite Congress' failure to approve the Better Schools 
Act of 1973. 20 
The President had relied heavily on the passage of 
the Better Schools Act. Federal statutory authority for 
the over 30 categorical grants for school aid, including 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the impact 
areas aid legislation, expired on June 30, 1973. 21 Prior 
to June 9, the administration had been telling school of-
ficials that it had no reserve plan for providing school 
aid if the revenue sharing bill failed to pass. 22 Instead 
of adopting the President's proposal, however, Congress 
chose to extend the existing federal aid to education pro-
grams through fiscal 1974. 23 
Early in 1974 President Nixon renewed his drive for 
the enactment of education revenue sharing. In January 
the President revealed his 1974 school aid plan, designed 
to "give more flexibility and authority to local communi-
ties.1124 The President indicated his proposals were 25 
framed to achieve the maximum possible consoli-
dation of funding authorities so that state and 
local agencies can use federal funds to meet 
national priorities in their own ways. 
By March, 1974, however, the President was in a mood 
for compromise. Speaking on a radio broadcast from Camp 
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David, Maryland,'on March 23, 26 President Nixon endorsed 
a bill 27 extending federal education aid for three years 28 
and providing some consolidation of existing programs. 29 
The President was quick to indicate, however, that H.R. 69 
was not his ultimate ~oal. He described the bill as ''an 
important first step1130 in meetinghis education goals; it 
did not, however, incorporate all the revisions in federal 
funding for public elementary and secondary education he 
had suggested. 31 President Nixon left plenty of room for 
the introduction of education revenue sharing in the 94th 
Congress. 
The Better Schools Act of 1973 
President Richard M. Nixon has presented his most 
serious challenge to Congress to enact an education reve-
nue sharing program in the form of the Better Schools Act 
of 1973. 32 In the particulars analyzed, it does not dif-
fer significantly from the President's 1971 proposal. 
Further, aside from the 1971 proposal, the Act is the only 
such program to have been introduced in Congress, and is 
the only such proposal currently before the 93d Congress. 
Therefore, it is this proposa~ the Better Schools Act of 
1973, which served as the revenue sharing for education 
model for this study. 
The Better Schools Act will now be analyzed, as has 
the other federal +egislation considered in this study, to 
ascertain the expressed intent of Congress, and the form 
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and payees or donees of the feder~l resou~ces. Only after 
such an analysis has been undertaken can the Act be com-
pared with the other federal programs discussed herein, 
and the degree of protection afforded local school dis-
tricts against a reduction in state aid funds as a conse-
quence of receiving federal revenue sharing funds be 
determined. 
The Better Schools Act begins with certain findings 
of fact concerning the role of the federal government in 
the funding of public education. The Act restates the 
position taken by President Nixon on numerous occasions 33 
that public education is primarily the responsibility of 
h d 1 1 . . 3 4 Tl f d 1 testates an oca communities. 1e e era govern-
ment, however, is found to have a role to play. 35 
[T]he Federal Government has a responsi-
bility to assist them [states and local commu-
nities] in meeting the costs of education in 
areas of special national concern. The Con-
gress finds, however, that prior programs of 
Federal financial assistance for elementary 
or secondary education are too narrow in scope 
to meet the needs of State and local school 
systems. 
The role the federal government is to assume under 
the Act is made clear when the stated purposes of the Act 
are examined. In the "purpose of this Act" paragraph, 36 
federal revenue sharing for education is called upon "to 
assist" in no less than five endeavors, "to encourage" in 
37 one, and "to assure" in one. 
It is therefore the purpose of this Act 
to consolidate certain current programs of 
Federal assistance to elementary or secondary 
Education into a system of Federal revenue 
sharing for education designed to assist in 
meeting such needs, to assist in encouraging 
innovation and development of new educational 
programs and practices, to assist in provid-
ing compensatory education for educationally 
deprived children, to assist in providing spe-
cial educational services needed by the physi-
cally or mentally handicapped, to encourage 
greater attention to the vital field of voca-
tional education, to assure to children whose 
parents live on Federal property an education 
comparable to that given to other children, 
and to assist in providing State and local 
educational officials with the flexibility 
and responsibility they need to make meaning-
ful decisions in response to the needs of their 
students. 
130 
The Congress' intent and purpose is clearly to leave pri-
mary responsibility at the state and local level, while 
providing federal assistance to states and local educa-
tional efforts to meet the needs of programs and students. 
A reading of section 4 of the Better Schools Act 
leaves no doubt that the resources which are the subject 
of the Act are moneys. Indeed, the bill is designed to 
provide a "share of the revenues of the United States to 
the States and to local educational agencies. 
The funds provided by the Better Schools Act would 
be extended by the federal government for basically five 
purposes. These purposes include (1) the education of 
children whose parents live on federal property, 39 (2) 
the education of the educationally disadvantaged, 40 (3) 
the education of the handicapped, 41 (4) vocational educa-
tion,42 and (5) the provision of supporting materials and 
services. 43 (As would be expected of a bill designed to 
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consolidate federal funding efforts, a number of statutory 
provisions would be repealed by the Act, including that 
portion of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 44 
and the impact areas aid legislation45 discussed in Chap-
ters IV and V, ~up~a.) Each of these purposes must be 
examined in succession to determine the payees and auth-
orized uses of the revenue to be shared. 
It should be noted at the outset that the Act itself 
provides that all payments to be made by the federal gov-
ernment under the Better Schools Act are to be made to 
the states. Therefore, while the states are not always 
to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the shared revenues, 
the states are the payees of the federal payments under 
the Act. 46 
The amounts appropriated and allotted 
pursuant to this Act shall be paid to the States 
at such intervals and in such installments as 
the Secretary may determine. Such amounts paid 
for any purpose under this Act shall also be 
available for construction to carry out such 
purpose. 
The Replacement of Impact Areas Aid 
Funds 
Subsection 4 (a) of the Better Schools Act provides, 
From the sums appropriated for carrying 
out this Act for any fiscal year the Secretary 
shall allot to each State an amount equal to 
60 per centum of the average per pupil expen-
diture in such State multiplied by the number 
of children in average daily attendance in 
the public elementary or secondary schools 
of such State during such year who resided 
on Federal pr9perty. The amount so allotted 
shall be available for any educational· pur-
pose. 
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It will be recalled that the impact areas aid legislation, 
which subsection 4 (a) of the Act is designed to supplant, 
provided that the federal payments made pursuant thereto 
were to be made directly to the impacted local educational 
agencies. 47 In the Better Schools Act, Congress would 
direct the state to pay to such local educational agencies 
their "impact areas aid. 1148 
Each State shall pay to each of its local 
educational agencies for a fiscal year an amount 
equal to the sums allotted to such State under 
section 4(a) for such year on account of the 
number of children in average daily attendance 
who resided on Federal property in the school 
district of such agency~ 
The pass-through of funds provided for by subsection 5 (a) 
is consistent with the corresponding provision of Presi-
dent Nixon's proposed Education Revenue Sharing Act of 
1971 49 and his interpretation of that Act. 50 
To offset the loss of local school taxes, Edu-
cation Revenue Sharing would provide a direct 
pass-through to local school districts enrol-
ling such children [i.e., those children who 
live on federal property]. 
Conspicuous by its absence in the Better Schools 
Act's sections designed to replace Subchapter I, Chapter 
13, Title 20 of the United States Code (impact areas aid) 
funds is any provision comparable to 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) 
(2). That section, it will be recalled, provided that no 
Subchapter I payments could be made to states which took 
Subchapter I payments into account when calculating the 
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el1gibility of local educational agencies for state aid or 
the amount thereof. 
The Replacement of Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act Funds 
The Better Schools Act's replacement for the funds 
provided by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is 
found in subsection 4 (c) . 51 
The amount allotted to a State under this 
subsection shall be available only for programs 
and project~ designed to meet the special edu-
cational needs, at the preschool or any other 
educational level, of educationally deprived 
children, and at least 75 per centum of such 
amount shall be available only for instruction 
in basic language or mathematics skills. 
The total amount allotted under subsection 4 (c) would be 
60 per cent of the remaining funds appropriated under the 
Act after the appropriate amount has been allotted under 
subsection 4 (a) and up through three per cent of the re-
maihder has been allotted to Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, and to the Secretary of the Interior, for 
Indian students served by schools operated by the Depart-
ment of the Interior, under subsection 4 (b). 
The funds paid to the states under subsection 4 (c) 
would not all be passed through to local educational agen-
. 52 c1es . 
. . . [The] State shall retain such amounts 
as it deems necessary for meeting the special 
educational needs of neglected or delinquent 
children and migratory children of migratory 
agricultural workers, except that the amount 
retained by such State under this paragraph 
for any fiscal year shall not exceed an amount 
equal to the expenditure index for such State 
for such year multiplied by the number of such 
children in such State during such year. 
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The remaining funds under subsection 4 (c) are to be dis-
tributed to the state's local educational agencies. 53 
From the remainder of the sums allotted 
to such State under section 4(c) for a fiscal 
year and not ... retained under paragraph 
(2), such State shall pay to each of its lo-
cal educational agencies which has more than 
five thousand children aged five to seventeen, 
inclusive, from families with incomes below 
the poverty level, or has more than 15 per 
centum of the total enrollment of its schools 
consisting of such children, an amount equal 
the product of--
(A) the expenditure index for such State 
for such year multiplied by 
(B) the number of such children from such 
families in the school district of such agency, 
(The "expenditure index" is "the higher o-.~ (A) . 35 multi-
plied by the average per pupil expenditure for such State, 
and (B) .35 multiplied by two-thirds of the average per 
54 pupil expenditure in the United States." ) 
The pass-through provision contained in subsection 
5 (b) (3), relating to subsection 4 (c) funds, i.e., those 
funds designed to take the place of Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act funds, is similar to that which re-
quires the states to distribute appropriate amounts under 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to their local 
d . l . 55 e ucat1ona agencies. It is to the same effect as the 
corresponding provision in the Education Revenue Sharing 
Act of 1971, 56 and is consistent with thi President's 
. . l . 57 or1g1na intent. 
These funds would be passed through directly 
to local school districts which enroll large 
concentrations of these children [i.e., child-
ren of poor families]. 
It will again be recalled that the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act contained a prohibition against 
Subchapter II payments being made to a state which took 
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into consideration Subchapter II payments in determining 
the eligibility of a local educational agency for state 
aid funds, or the amount thereof. 58 No s~milar prohibi-
' tory clause is found in those sections of the Better 
Schools Act designed to replace Subchapter II funds. 
Aid for the Education of the Handi-
capped, Vocational Education, and 
Supplementary Services 
The Better Schools Act's provision of funds for the 
education of the handicapped, vocational education, and 
supplementary services is found in subsection 4 (d). The 
funds allotted to the states for these services would be 
apportioned on a school-age population basis. 59 
After application of the provisions of 
subsections (a), (b), and (c) [the provisions 
supplying replacement funds for Subchapter I 
funds, revenue sharing funds for the outlying 
areas and Indian students in Department of 
the Interior schools, and replacement funds 
for Subchapter II funds, respectively] for a 
fiscal year, the Secretary shall allot to each 
State an amount which bears the same ratio to 
the remainder of the sums appropriated for 
c.arrying out this Act for· such year as the 
number of children aged five to seventeen, 
inclusive, in-such State bears to the number 
of such children in all of the S~ates 
Subsection 4 (d) (2) provides for the division of the 
available funds among the various uses. 60 
Except as provided in section 7--
(A) 16 per centum of the amount allotted 
to a State under paragraph (1) shall be avail-
able only for programs and projects at the 
preschool or any other educational level de-
.signed to meet the special educational needs 
of handicapped children; 
(B) 43 per centum of such amount shall 
be available only for vocational edutation 
activities; and 
(C) 41 per centum of such amoun-·: shall 
be avail~ble 8f1Y for supporting mat~rials 
and services. 
Unlike the funds provided by subsections 4 (a) and 
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4 (c), the funds to be distributed to the states under the 
Better Schools Act for the education of the handicapped, 
vocational education, and supplementary services need not 
be further distributed to local educational agencies. 62 
The State would be entitled to use funds 
allotted under these provision~ for the pur-
poses prescribed, in accordance with a State 
plan developed under section 9 of the Act. 
It could retain the funds or distribute them 
among the local educational agencies of the 
State on a basis reflecting the relative needs 
of those agencies for the various types of 
program. However, in determining these rela-
tive needs, the State could not take into 
account assistance received by the local 
agencies under the provisions of this Act 
allotting funds for special programs for dis-
advantaged children. 
That states, rather than local educational agencies, . 
should have discretion with respect to the funds provided 
for these three purposes is consistent with President 
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Nikon's tiriginal design for education revenue sharing. In 
earl~ 1971, , the President said concerning his plan for 
. I 
funds for education 'of the handicapped, "Funds would be 
I 
allocated directly to the States and procedures for ob-
taining these funds would be simplified. 1163 Concerning 
his plan for vocational education funds, he said, " ... 
States and local educational authorities would be auth-
orized to determine how best to use Federal funds for 
vocational education in order to meet the needs of parti-
cular communities and individual workers,•• 64 although lo-
cal educational authorities were not to have been required 
to receive such funds under either the Education Revenue 
Sharing Act of 1971 65 or the Better Schools Act of 1973. 66 
With respect to the funds to be provided for supplementary 
services, the President has said, 67 
Education Revenue Sharing would continue this 
aid but would pull together programs from at 
least fourteen separate statutory provisions 
into one flexible allocation under which the 
States can decide how best to meet local edu-
cation needs. 
With these facets of the education revenue sharing 
plan currently before the Congress, i.e.~ the Better 
Schools Act of 1973, in mind, the protection afforded a 
local school district· against a loss of state aid funds 
as a consequence of receiving federal revenue sharing 
funds can be determined. The protection accorded local 
school districts by courts against a loss of state aid 
funds, as a consequence of receiving funds under the 
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congressional township fund legislation, the national 
forest reserve and federal flood control legislation, and 
the impact areas aid legislation has hinged, to a major 
extent, on the available evidence concerning the intent 
of Congress in providing the respective funds and the de-
signation of the payee of such funds. The Better Schools 
Act can now be analyzed in light of previous legislation 
and litigation to determine the degree (if any) of pro-
tection local educational agencies can expect under the 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PROTECTION AFFORDED LOCAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS AGAINST A REDUCTION IN 
STATE AID FUNDS AS A CONSEQUENCE 
OF RECEIVING FEDERAL REVENUE 
SHARING FUNDS 
Each of the three lines of decisions (i.e., those in-
volving the congressional township funds, the national 
forest reserve and federal flood control funds, and the 
impact areas aid funds, respectively) analyzed in this 
study helps to determine the protection afforded local 
school districts against a reduction in state aid funds as 
a consequence of receiving federal revenue sharing funds. 
The form of resources provided by the federal government 
consisted of moneys in each of the major pieces of legis-
lation considered, and is to consist of moneys under the 
education revenue sharing proposal, the Better Schools 
Act of 1973, currently before the Congress. Although the 
original reservations and grants of the congressional 
township fund legislation took the form of land, the sale 
of such land had been authorized and the conversion of 
that land into the proceeds of a sale had been accomplished 
before each of the respective grants became the subject of 
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litigation. Thus, the form of resources under considera-
tion has been the same in both the legislation and litiga-
tion analyzed and the currently~proposed education revenue 
sharing plan. 
While the form of resources provided in the past and 
currently proposed to be provided has been and is consis-
tent, however, the expressed intent of Congress (and, 
therefore, the source of the controlling law 1n the liti-
gation) and the payees of the funds provided have not been 
consistent. Consequently, the protection afforded local 
school districts against a loss of state aid funds as a 
consequence of receiving federal funds under the congres-
sional township fund legislation, the national forest re-
serve and federal flood control measures, and the impact 
areas aid legislation has not been consistent, either. 
The Better Schools Act can now be compared with the earli-
er pieces of federal legislation and the results of the 
litigation stemming therefrom to determine the protection 
afforded local school districts against a loss of state 
aid funds as a consequence of receiving federal revenue 
sharing funds under the Act. 
The Protection Afforded Under 
Alternative Formulations of 
Congressional Intent 
The intent of Congress regarding the resources pro-
vided for educational purposes as expressed in the federal 
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legislation granting lands to inhabitants of townships 
and authorizing the sale of such lands in. the first half 
of the nineteenth century can perhaps best be described 
as unspecific. The Indiana enabling act's grant of lands 
indicated that the grant was intend.ed '~for the use of 
schools. 111 When the sale of the lands granted was auth-
orized in 1828, Congress again stated its intent and the 
purpose of the proceeds of the sales in broad terms: "for 
the use and support of schools, within the several town-
ships and districts of the country for which they were 
originally set apart. 112 
With no more than these two formulations of congres-
sional intent to guide it, the Indiana supreme court, in 
the line of decisions beginning with State v. Sp~ing6ield 
Town-0hip, 3 directed its attention, in the challenges al-
leging the state's misapplication of the funds, to speci-
fie questions of state law. In State v. Sp~ing6ield 
Town-0hip, 4 where the state was found to have attempted "to 
distribute to the people of-the state at large a school 
fund created for the exclusive use of the inhabitants of 
Springfield township, 115 the court invalidated the state 
action not because the intent of Congress had been vio-
lated, but because the state's own constitution was vio-
lated by such state action. 6 The intent of·Congress was 
examined in that case only to determine whether the Indi-
ana constitution was being followed, not to find the de-
gree of protection afforded local educational agencies 
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against a-loss even of the ~ongressionally granted funds 
(although the result of the court's, examination offered 
the local agency's requested protection under the consti-
tution, and, under the language of State v. Mathew6, 7 
would have offered the same protection had the court 
sought to find it under the congressional enactment it-
self). 
The Indiana decisions 8 subsequent to State v. Sp~lng-
oleld ToWn6hlp, the decisions which dealt with reductions 
in state aid (not diversions of the federal funds them-
selves) to local educational agencies as a consequence of 
those agencies receiving the congressional township funds, 
dealt with the intent of Congress only briefly. In each 
case the court found that the funds which Congress had di-
rected to go to specific local educational agencies were 
indeed going to those agencies, and as long as the con-
gressional enactment was not being violated to that ex-
h l "b d g 1· . tent, testate was at 1 erty to re uce or even e 1m1-
nate10 state aid as a consequence of the local agency 
receiving the federal funds. The Indiana supreme court 
read no protection for local educational agencies into 
the formulations of congressional intent with which it was 
dealing. 
If there is no protection afforded local educational 
agencies against a reduction in state aid funds as a con-
sequence of receiving federal funds when Congress indi-
cates those funds are "for the use of schools 1111 and "for 
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the use and support of schools, within the several town-
ships and districts [i.e., the local educational agencies' 
jurisdictions] of the country for which they were original-
12 ly set apart," it is not surprising that no such protec-
tion is afforded, either, where the Congress provides 
federal funds to local educational agencies under legisla-
tion devoid of any declaration of intent concerning those 
funds, other than that they "benefit" certain schools. In 
the national forest reserve and federal flood control leg-
islation, Congress only stated that the moneys provided 
were to be13 
expended as the State legislature may pre-
scribe for the benefit of [the] public schools 
and public roads 
of the county or counties in which the forest reserve or 
flood control property was located. 
In the initial decision analyzed dealing with funds 
provided under the national forest reserve legislation, 
the United States Supreme Court alloweq a state to expend 
all the federal funds on public roads, to the exclusion 
of the public schools. 14 Thus, the principle was estab-
lished that where Congress names two beneficiaries, a 
local educational agency, should it be one of those bene-
ficiaries, is not even afforded protection against receiv-
ing none of the funds provided by Congress. While State 
v. Sp~ing 0ield Town~hip refused to sanction a diversion 
of the federal funds provided where only one beneficiary 
was named, King County, Wa~hington, v. Seattle Sehool 
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Vi~t~iet No. 115 permitted such a diversion of even the 
federal funds in question when two beneficiaries were 
named. While not citing the United States Supreme Court 
decision, 16 the Oklahoma supreme court in its 1950s de-
cisions had no trouble allowing a reduction in state aid 
to a-local educational agency as a consequence of that 
agency being the beneficiary of federal forest reserve 
or federal flood control funds under the applicable dec-
lara~ion of intent, 17 provided such a reduction did not 
violate state law. The discretion of the state in using 
such funds, limited only by the requirement that the use 
conform to the specific congressional language employed, 
was permitted in each of the Oklahoma decisions. 19 
There is no limitation upon the power of the 
legislature to prescribe how the expenditures 
shall be made for the purposes stated .... 
No trust for the benefit of appellee [school 
district] is created by the grant. 
Some slight problems are caused by Ca~~oll v. B~una, 20 
in that it is the only decision which purports to find a 
purpose for the funds provided by the national forest re-
serve legislation broader than the "benefit" of public 
schools and public roads. The Ca~~oll court, it will be 
recalled, found that the funds provided were "a contribu-
tion in lieu of taxes. 1121 The problems caused by such an 
interpretation of congressional intent, however, should 
be slight, since the interpretation did not impede the 
Washington supreme court from relying on the earlier Okla-
homa decisions, and reaffirming the position that where 
Congress provides for federal funds to benefit public 
schools within the 1 jurisdiction of certain local educa-
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tional agencies under the prescription of the state legis-
lature, such agencies are afforded no protection against a 
loss of state aid as a consequence of receiving those fed-
eral funds. 
The decisions reviewed to this point have been con-
sistent: there is no protection afforded a local educa-
tional agency against a reduction of state aid as a 
consequence of receiving federal aid funds because such 
22 funds are "for the use of schools," "for the use and 
support of schools, within the several townships and dis-
tricts [i.e., local educational agencies' jurisdictions] 
of the country for which they were originally set apar~123 
or to be "expended as the State legislature may prescribe 
for the benefit of [the] public schools and public roads'124 
in a ·certain county or in certain counties. Equally con-
sistent, although reaching opposite results, have been the 
cases in which the intent of Congress has been expressed 
in more specific terms. 
In the impact areas aid legislation, Congress de-
1 d . 1· 25 care 1ts po icy 
to provide financial assistance (as set forth 
in this subchapter) for tpose local education-
al agencies upon which the United States has 
placed financial burdens by reason of the fact 
that--
(1) the revenues available to such agen-
cies from local sources have been reduced as 
the result of the acquisition of real property 
by the United States; or 
(2) such agencies provide education for 
children residing on Federal property; or. 
(3) such agencies provide education for 
children whose parents are employed on Federal 
property; or 
(4) there has been a sudden and substan-
tial increase in school attendance as the re-
sult of Federal activities. 
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When interpreting this legislation, the courts in each of 
the five cases 26 considered in the primary line of the 
Chapter V, -0upha, decisions refused to permit a reduction 
in state aid to local educational agencies as a conse-
quence of those agencies receiving impact areas aid. Only 
the last impact areas aid case, however, Thiplett v. Tie-
27 · mann, adopted its position relying primarily on the 
above statutory declaration of intent. The other cases 
relied heavily on the fact that the local educational agen-
cy was the designated payee (See inoha.) and on a congres-
28 sional committee report. Nevertheless, Thiplett does 
provide authority for concluding that state aid to a local 
educational agency cannot be reduced as a consequence of 
that agency receiving federal funds where the purpose of 
the funds is similar to that stated in the impact aid leg-
. l . 29 1s at1on. 
Here, as indicated, the purpose and nature 
of the federal payments involved were made clear 
on the face of the federal statute. They were 
intended to provide special assistance to 'lo-
cal educational agencies' for federal impact. 
The proposed intent of Congress as expressed in the 
Better Schools Act of 1973 does not match exactly, of 
course, any of the corresponding declarations of policy 
151 
or intent previously considered. More spt!Cific language 
than that found in the congressional town~,hip fund legis-
lation, the natio~al forest reserve legislation, and the 
federal flood control legislation is used in the Act. In 
its efforts "to assist," "to _encourage," and "to assure1130 
specific programs and results, the Better Schools Act 
comes closer than legislation providing funds "for the 
-· use," "for the use and support," or "for the benefit of1131 
public schools to naming its objectives. 
The intent of Congress provision of the Better 
Schools Act may not be nearly so helpful to.local educa-
tional agencies as T~lplett found the corresponding pro-
vision of the impact aid legislation, however. Where the 
impact aid legislation sought "to provide financial assis-
tance . . . for ... local educational agencies, 1132 the 
proposed system of federal revenue sharing is designed "to 
· II • • 1 • 33 assist primari y programs, not agencies. Where the 
level of institutions conducting such programs is named, 
both the state and local levels are included. 34 
It is therefore the purpose of this Act 
to consolidate certain current programs of 
Federal assistance to elementary and second-
ary education into a system of Federal revenue 
sharing for education designed to assist in 
meeting such needs [presumably, 'the needs 
of State and local school systems' referred 
to in section 2 (a)], ... and to assist in 
providing State and local educational officials 
with the flexibility and responsibility they 
need to make meaningful decisions in response 
to the needs of their students. 
Therefore, while the T~iplett court could conclude that 
i 52 
the impact areas aid was "intended to provide special as-
sistance to 'local educational agencies' for federal im-
pact,1135 a court interpreting the Better Schools Act would 
have to conclude that the states also are to receive as-
sistance under the Act. 
It will be recalled that the Better Schools Act sec-
tions designed to replace the impact areas aid contain no 
provision comparable to 20 U.S.C. § 240 (<l) (2), providing 
that no Subchapter I (impact areas aid) payments could be 
made to states which took Subchapter I payments into ac-
count when calculating the eligibility of local education-
al agencies for state aid or the amount thereof. It will 
be recalled further, however, that the district court in 
Ca~l-0bad Union School Vi-0t~iet 06 San Vie/o County v. 
Ra66e~ty 36 rejected the argument that language such as 
20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) (2) was necessary to prohibit a reduc-
tion in state aid to local educational agencies as a con-
sequence of those agencies receiving Subchapter I funds. 
It appears, therefore, that the issue "whether the appro-
priate federal officials are authorized to make certain 
payments under state actions reducing or e1iminating state 
aid to local educational agencies as a:consequence of 
those agencies receiving federal payments" is not deter-
minative of the issue of whether a state can reduce its 
aid to local educational agencies as a consequence of 
those agencies receiving federal funds. Thus, the exclu-
sion of a clause similar to 20 U.S.C. § 240 (d) (2) in the 
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Better Schools Act would not, under the authority of the 
Canljbad case, be dispositive of the issue of whether a 
reduction of state aid to local educational agencies as a 
consequence of those agencies receiving federal revenue 
sharing funds is authorized. Courts would be free to ex-
amine the language expressing congressional intent, as 
did the Tniplett court. 
It appears that the intent of Congress provision of 
the Better Schools Act of 1973 affords no protection to a 
local school district against a reduction of state aid 
funds as a consequence of that district receiving federal 
revenue sharing funds under the Act. The differences be-
tween the intent provisions of the congressional township 
fund, national forest reserve, and federal flood control 
legislation, on the one hand, and the Better Schools Act, 
on the other, are differences in degree. In none of these 
acts has Congress attempted to underwrite completely pub-
lic school financing, and the President has recently re-
iterated that primary responsibility in this area remains 
at the state and local levei. 37 While the earlier legis-
lation provides funds for "use," "support," and "benefit," 
the Better Schools Act would provide funds "to assist," 
"to encourage," and "to assure~" While the earlier legis-
lation names local schools as beneficiaries, the Act is 
perhaps more specific, and names programs. 
The message of the decisions examined in this study, 





v .. B4una, each case which analyzed the 
' I .• 
congressional township. fl,lnd, the national forest reserve, 
or federal f16od co~trol legislation arrived at the same 
conclusion: theie is no protection afforded a local edu-
cational agency against a r,eduction in state aid as a con-
sequence of receiving those federal funds. The discretion 
concerning the use of state aid funds remained with the 
states. 
On the other hand, the difference between the intent 
provision ;of the impact areas aid legislation and the Bet-
ter Schools Act is a difference in kind, not degree. In 
the intent section of the former enactment the Congress 
named certain local educational agencies as beneficiaries 
of the aid funds, not mentioning states. The intent pro-
vision of the Better Schools Act, however, indicates no 
specific agencies (e.g., local educational agencies) which 
are to be benefited to the exclusion of others (e.g., the 
states) by the aid (although the Act does provide for the 
state to distribute some of the funds allotted to it to 
its local educational agencies pursuant to a congression-
ally provided formula 40), but rather suggests that the 
needs Congress would attempt to address in the Act are 
those of both "State and local school 41 systems." There-
fore, the decisions from Shephea4d v. G d . 42 h h a W,t.n. t roug 
T · 0 .t:t T · 43 . d. t t. t 1 1 d 4,tp~e v. ,t.eman.n., prov1 1ng pro ec ion o oca e u-
cational agencies against a reduction in state aid funds 
as a consequence of receiving impact areas aid funds would 
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/ 
be of no help to local districts under the Better Schools 
Act, since th~se cases interpreted a significantly differ-
ent intent of Congress. 
I 
It should be recalled that only Tniplett of the im-
pact areas aid cases went directly to the intent of Con-
gress clause of Subchapter I to reach its·decisions. Each 
of the cases in that line examined a congressional commit-
tee report concerning the 1966 amendment to Subchapter I. 
Of course, as yet no congressional committee report exists 
concerning the Better Schools Act, so there is no corres-
ponding source under the Act to aid in the determination 
of congressional intent. 
Finally, although the point was not emphasized in 
Hengen~eten v. Hayden 44 nor in Canl-0bad Union School Vi-0-
tnict 06 San Viego County v. Ra66enty, 45 two of the cases, 
Shepheand v. Godwin46 and Vougla-0 Independent School Vi-0-
tnict No. 3 v. Jongen-0on, 47 afforded protection to local 
school districts against a reduction of state aid funds as 
a consequence of receiving Subchapter I funds largely for 
the reason that the local educational agencies had been 
named by Congress as the payees of the federal aid funds. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to examine this final aspect 
of the federal legislation discussed in this study to 
determine whether it may provide such protection to local 
educational agencies under the Better Schools Act. 
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The Protection Afforded Under Alter-
native. Designations of Payees 
of Federal Funds 
In determining the protection afforded local school 
districts against a reduction in state aid funds as a con-
sequence of receiving federal funds by the respective des-
ignations of payees under past and proposed federal 
legislation, it is appropriate to examine, in this in-
stance, the proposed legislation first. For all funds to 
be paid by the federal government under the Better Schools 
Act, the states would serve as the payees. 48 
The amounts appropriated and allotted 
pursuant to this Act shall be paid to the 
States at such intervals and in such install-
ments as the Secretary [of Health, Education, 
and Welfare] may determine. 
Complicating the above neat designation of the states 
as the payees of the proposed federal revenue sharing 
funds are two provisions directing the states to "pay to 
each of its local educational agencies" that portion of 
h f d d · d 1 · t a1·d49 and that t e un s es1gne to rep ace 1mpac areas 
portion (except for the funds the state is authorized to 
retain for delinquent and migratory children 50) of the 
funds designed to replace the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act funds. 51 These provisions in the Better 
Schools Act are consistent with President Richard M. 
52 Nixon's initial revenue sharing proposals. It is a 
matter of speculation whether courts would treat local 
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educational agencies under these prov is i<:ms as "payees" of 
the federal funds under the Better Schools Act, but it is 
unlikely that that issue alone would determine whether the 
agencies are afforded protection against a reduction in 
state aid funds. 
In the initial litigation considered in this study, 
the federal resources, in that case, lands, were granted 
to inhabitants of local geographic areas. In the Indiana 
enabling act, Congress provided53 
Fi~-0t. That the section numbered sixteen, 
in every township, and when such section has 
been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands, 
equivalent thereto, and most contiguous to the 
same, shall be granted to the inhabitants of 
such township for the use of schools. 
The initial decision of the congressional township fund 
series, State v. Sp~ing6ield Town-0hip, 54 quoted approving-
ly language of the United States Supreme Court emphasizing 
the local nature of the payees named. 55 
'The citizens within the township are the bene-
ficiaries of the charity. The title to these 
lands has never been considered in the state; 
and it has no inherent right to appropriate 
them to any purpose other than for the bene-
fit of schools. For the exercise of the chari-
ty under the laws, the title is in the town-
ship.' Vineenne-0 Unive~~ity v. Indiana, 
14 How. 268. 
The same court which used the above quoted authority 
to justify refusing to permit the state to divert the fed-
eral funds provided from the township-beneficiary in State 
v. Sp~ing6ield Town-0hip, however, consistently held, in 
Quick v. White-Wate~ Town-0hip 56 and the cases which 
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followed, that the state could reduce or even eliminate 
its aid commitment to its' townships because of the town-
ships' receiving the congressional grant and the proceeds 
of the sale thereof. Thus, it is apparent that the fact 
that local educational agencies are. the designated payees 
in the congressional enactment will not of itself prohibit 
a reduction in state aid to local educational agencies as 
a consequence of those agencies receiving federal funds. 
In both the national forest reserve and federal flood 
control legislation the states, and not the local educa-
tional agencies, were named as the payees of the federal 
funds provided for education. The national forest reserve 
· 57 
measure provides that the funds 
shall be paid ... by the Secretary of the 
Treasury to the State in which such national 
forest is situated, to be expended as the State 
legislature may prescribe for the benefit of 
the public schools and public roads of the 
county or counties in which such national 
forest is situated ... 
A similar provision is found in the federal flood control 
1 . l . 58 eg1s at1on. 
The principle was adopted early that since the state 
was the named payee, the state had discretion concerning 
the use of the funds. 59 
When turned over to the State, the money 
belongs to it absolutely. There is no limita-
tion upon the power of the legislature to pre-
scribe how the expenditures shall be made for 
the purposes stated .... No trust for the 
benefit of the appellee [school district] is 
created by the grant. 
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The fact that the state legislatures were given the 
power to prescribe how the expenditures should have been 
made for education in the national forest reserve and fed-
eral flood control statutes, while under the Better Schools 
Act the legislatures are directed to pass the revenue 
sharing funds designed to replace the impact areas aid and 
the major portion of those funds designed to replace the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act funds through to 
their local educational agencies, will not necessarily re-
sult in protection to local school districts against a re-
duction in state aid funds under the Better Schools Act 
while such protection was denied under the national forest 
reserve and federal flood control measures. First, in the 
Better Schools Act provision allotting funds to replace 
the impact areas aid, the language, "The amount so allot-
ted shall be available for any educational purpose, 1160 
appears, but there is no statement concerning whether the 
states or the local educational agencies are to make the 
final determination of which purposes will be served. In 
the Act's provision allotting funds to replace the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act's aid, it would be re-
quired that "at least 75 per centum of such amount shall 
be available only for instruction in basic language or 
mathematics skills, 1161 but the Act is devoid of language 
indicating who will have the final authority over the spe-
cifics of such 75 per cent of the allotment and how and 
under whose authority the remaining 25 per cent of such 
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allotment will be spent. The provisions granting aid 
restricted to the uses of handicapped children's education, 
t . 1 d . d . . . 62 ld voca 1ona e ucat1on, an support~ng services wou re-
sult in the funds provided going directly to the state, 
with no pass-through to the local educational agencies re-
quired. Therefore, there appear to be no restrictions on 
the states' discretion concerning the funds to be provided 
under the Better Schools Act which would require the 
states to relinquish final authority to local educational 
agencies over the programs to be assisted. 
Second, in neither the national forest reserve and 
federal flood control legislation nor the Better Schools 
Act has Congress attempted to restrict the way in which 
the state distributes its own funds. The reasoning of 
the Oklahoma supreme court in State ex rel. Boa~d~ 06 Edu-
eation 06 Independent Sehool Vi~t~iet~ No. 1-2 and No. 1-3 
06 ManJhall County v. State Boand 06 Edueation, 63 allowing 
a reduction in state aid to local educational agencies as 
a consequence of receiving federal funds under the flood 
control legislation, made clear the distinction between 
state legislative discretion over federal moneys and such 
discretion over state funds, and was worded in sufficiently 
broad language to apply to the federal revenue sharing 
funds to be provided by the Better Schools Act. 64 
... But we do not construe the Federal 
Statute as attempting to control the method 
by which this State apportions its own funds 
appropriated for Equalization Aid to its schools. 
There is, therefore, no violation of the Feder-
al Statute. 
Third, and finally, the states would not be wholly 
without a role in distributing the Better Schools Act's 
funds designed to replace the impact aid and Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act's funds. In addition to 
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naming specifically the states as the payees of all funds 
to be provided, the Better Schools Act charges a state 
officer with the responsibility of administering the Act's 
65 programs. 
The chief executive officer of a State 
shall be the State agency responsible for 
administration (or supervision of the admini-
stration) of the program under this Act in 
such State, except that a specified single 
State agency shall be.responsible for such 
administration (or supervision of admini-
stration) if such officer determines that 
the law of such State so provides. 
This language is clearly different from the impact areas 
aid provision by-passing the states. It appears to leave 
considerable room for state discretion concerning the ulti-
mate effect of the programs to be administered under the 
Act. 
In these first two lines of decisions, involving the 
congressional township fund legislation and the national 
forest reserve and federal flood control legislation, 
Congress named, in the first instance, what can be termed 
local educational agencies as the payees of the resources 
provided, and, in the second instance, the states as the 
payees of the federal funds. Both lines of cases permitted 
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states to reduce state aid to local educational agencies 
as a consequerice of those ~gencies ~~ini ~he beneficiaries 
of the federal payments under the respective intent of 
Congress clauses, indicating that the designation of the 
payee is not determinative of the issue of whether such 
reductions are permitted under the federal laws. 
The only series of cases which has not yet been ana-
lyzed in this section considering the significance of the 
designated payees of the federal moneys is that involving 
Subchapter I (impact areas) aid. The Subchapter I enact-
ment provided for the federal payments to be made directly 
to the local educational agencies involved. 66 
The Commissioner shall, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (c) [Adjustments where 
necessitated by approp~iations] of this sec-
tion, from time to time pay to each local edu-
cational agency, in advance or otherwise, the 
amount which he estimates such agency is en-
titled to receive under this subchapter .... 
While each of the cases analyzed dealing primarily 
with Subchapter I refused to permit a state to reduce its 
aid to a local educational agency as a consequence of re-
ceiving Subchapter I funds, it is significant that no case 
hinged such a refusal solely on the ground that the local 
educational agency was the designated payee of the funds. 
Even the Shepheand v. Godwln 67 court, the first leading 
proponent of examining the congressional designation of 
the payees, examined also the intent of Congress, not as 
found in the legislation perhaps, but as found in the le-
gislative history of the Subchapter. 68 Additionally, that 
163 
court also considered the method of computation of the aid 
to the local educational agency as supportive of its de-
. . 69 v d c1s1on. ougla-0 In ependent School Vi-0tniet No. 3 v • 
. 70 
JongenJon, the other leading proponent of examining the 
designation of the payees of the federal funds, also 
quoted the same congressional committee report as Shep-
heand to determine congressional intent, and to further 
justify its holding. 
The point of the Subchapter I cases in this context 
is that no court has yet prohibited a reduction of state 
aid to a local educational agency as a consequence of re-
ceiving federal moneys solely on the basis that the local 
educati6nal agency was the designated payee of the aid 
funds. Both Shephea~d and Vougla-0 Independent examined 
at length, and admittedly held significant, the fact that 
the local educational agencies were the named payees. 
Nevertheless, both courts also relied heavily on what they 
found to be the congressional intent. Of course, the 
other case of some significance in the line, T~iplett v. 
T . 71 · 1 · ~emann, relied in its opinion on congressiona intent 
as enacted in the statute. 
It appears, therefore, that the designation of the 
payees in the revenue sharing proposal, the Better Schools 
Act, will not alone prohibit a reduction in state aid to 
local educational agencies as a consequence of receiving 
federal revenue sharing moneys under the Act. The Better 
Schools Act names the states as the payees of all federal 
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revenues to be shared under the Act, although those funds 
designed to replace Subchapter I (impact areas aid) and 
Subchapter II (Elementary and Secondary Education Act) 
funds are to be passed through the states to the local 
educational agencies. Consequently, even if the Subchap-
ter I cases would serve as analogous cases for cases under 
the Better Schools Act, the authority would only extend to 
cases involving revenue sharing funds designed to replace 
Subchapter I and Subchapter II funds. 
Even in instances involving Subchapter I and Subchap-
ter II replacement funds, however, the Subchapter I cases 
would not appear to prohibit a reduction in state aid to 
local educational agencies as a consequence of rece1v1ng 
the federal revenue sharing funds. First, the local edu-
cational agencies are not technically the payees of the 
federal payments under the Better Schools Act, as they 
were under Subchapter I. 72 Even more important, however, 
is the consideration that each major Subchapter I case 
also relied on congressional intent in reaching its deci-
sion. It was pointed out in the previous section of this 
chapter, ~up4a, that the declaration of congressional in-
tent of the Better Schools Act differs substantially, and 
in kind, from that with which the courts worked in Sub-
chapter I. 
Finally, the congressional township fund cases and 
the national forest reserve and federal flood control 
cases make clear that the issue of whether the state or 
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local educational ag~ncies are the designated payees is of 
no'conseqtience where the congressional intent does not 
support a prohibition of the reduction of state aid to 
local educational agencies as a consequence of receiving 
federal funds. The similarities of the declarations of 
intent concerning the funds provided for education be-
tween the Better Schools Act and the congressional town-
ship fund, the national forest reserve, and the federal 
flood control legislation have been examined and found 
to be substantial; differences are differences of degree. 
The primary conclusion to be drawn from these federal 
enactments and the state and federal cases arising there-
under is clear. There is no protection afforded a local 
school district against a ioss of state aid funds as a 
consequence of receiving federal revenue sharing funds 
under the Better Schools Act of 1973, the only education 
revenue sharing proposal currently before the United 
States Congress. 
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72some argument could be made that since the local 
educational agencies would receive funds paid by the fed-
eral government to the states, with the stipulation that 
those funds be passed through to local school districts, 
under the Better Schools Act, those local educational 
agencies should be treated as payees of the federal funds, 
and protected to the same extent as have been the desig-
nated payees of Subchapter I funds: This reasoning would 
find support in the language of the Hobson v. Hansen, 269 
F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), a66'd ~ub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and Rodriguez v. San Anto-
nio Independent School Dist., 337 F.Supp. 280 (W.D.Tex. 
1971), ~ev'd, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973), decisions, which joined 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, of which 20 
U.S.C. § 241g (a) (2) (1970) provides for a pass-through 
of federal funds similar to those found in the Better 
Schools Act, with Subchapter I for purposes of determining 
the appropriate uses of the federal funds. It must be 
remembered, however, that the issue of whether the state 
or the local educational agency was the payee of either 
the Subchapter I or Subchapter II funds was not before the 
court in either instance, nor was either case primarily 
concerned with the issue of this study when Subchapter I 
and Subchapter II were treated as similar, Hobson being a 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
As early as the last quarter of the 18th century, the 
United States government initiated a federal role in the 
funding of public education. In 1785 Congress reserved 
certain lands included in the rectangular survey "for the 
maintenance of schools." In the first quarter of the fol-
lowing century, these lands were granted to the inhabitants 
of the townships in which the lands were located. Later, 
Congress authorized the sale of the lands reserved, with 
the stipulation that the proceeds were to be forever ap-
plied "for the use and support of schools" of the respec-
tive townships. 
The language of the above described congressional 
township fund legislation used rather broad terms to .char-
acterize the purposes to which the resources provided by 
the federal government could be put. Congress merely in-
dicated its intent that the funds be applied to the main-
tenance, use, and support of certain schools. In addition, 
resources provided by Congress were granted to the inhabi-
tants of geographic subdivisions of the states, or to what 
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would be characterized today as focal educational 
agencies. 
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Under the combination of these broad declarations of 
intent and direct grants to local educational agencies, 
the Indiana supreme court, in the only reported decisions 
on the issue, consistently permitted the State of Indiana 
to reduce its aid to its local eµucational agencies as a 
consequence of those agencies receiving congressional 
township funds. In other words, because local educational 
agencies had received funds pursuant to the congressional 
township fund legislation, they received less state aid 
than they would have received had they not received the 
congressional township funds. 
Under the provisions of the current national forest 
reserve and federal flood control legislation, Congress 
provides funds "for the benefit of the public schools and 
public roads" of those counties in which national forests 
and lands acquired by the United States for flood-control 
purposes are located. The phrase, "for the benefit of 
the public schools and public roads," is the only evidence 
of congressional intent concerning the uses which are to 
be made of the funds provided in the respective acts. 
While this language of intent is not significantly differ-
ent from that employed in the congressional township fund 
legislation, a significant difference between the national 
forest reserve and federal flood control legislation, on 
the one hand, and the congressional township fund 
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legislation, on the other, does appear. Where the con-
gressional township fund legislation named the inhabitants 
of townships as the payees of the resources, the national 
forest reserve and federal flood control measures provide 
for the payment of the federal funds to the states, to be 
expanded as the state legislatures may prescribe. 
Two courts of last resort have considered directly 
the issue of whether a state can reduce its aid to local 
educational agencies as a consequence of the schools of 
those agencies being the beneficiaries of national forest 
reserve and federal flood control funds. Consistently, 
the Supreme Courts of Oklahoma and Washington have answered 
the issue in the affirmative, and have permitted the re-
spective states to reduce their aid to such local educa-
tional agencies from the amount to which such agencies 
would have been entitled had those federai funds not been 
available. 
The resolution of the issue of whether a state can 
reduce its aid to local school districts as a consequence 
of those districts receiving federal funds has been dif-
ferent from the aforementioned decisions only in cases 
involving what is known as "impact areas" aid. In the 
impact areas aid legislation, Congress has stated its poli-
cy "to provide financial assistance ... for those local 
educational agencies upon which the United States has 
placed financial burdens" by virtue of described federal 
activity. The aid funds provided by this legislation are 
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paid directly to the 1o'c~1- educational ,agencies involved 
by the United States Commissione~ of Education. 
Citing what they perceived to be the intent of Con-
gress to aid specifically certain local school districts, 
and placing considerable significance on what institutions 
they found to be the designated payees of the impact areas 
aid, five United States district courts and one federal 
circuit court of appeals have held that states cannot re-
duce aid to local educational agencies as a consequence 
of those agencies receiving federal impact aid funds. 
While designated payees of the impact aid funds and of 
the congressional township funds were, for purposes of 
legal significance, the same, the result of the litigation 
involving reductions in state aid under the two series 
of federal enactments was markedly different. 
Consistency in the decisions analyzed in this study 
is found when the respective pieces of legislation con-
strued are grouped according to the declarations of con-
gressional intent. When congressional intent is broadly 
stated in terms of aiding educational institutions as in 
the congressional township fund, the national forest re-
serve, and the federal flood control legi~lation, the 
courts have sanctioned the states' reduction of state aid 
to the beneficiaries of the federal funds as a consequence 
of the respective local educational agencies receiving the 
federal funds. Where the congressional intent is more 
specifically defined to aid agencies charged with the 
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responsibility to administer such schools and their pro-
grams, however, court§ have consistently invalidated re-
ductions in state aid to local educational agencies as a 
consequence of those agen~ies receiving the federal funds. 
Conclusions 
The three lines of decisions involving the congres-
sional township fund legislation, the national forest re-
serve and federal flood control legislation, and the 
impact areas aid legislation include all the reported 
cases in which courts have had to decide whether a state 
can reduce its aid to a local school district as a con-
sequence of that district receiving federal funds. It is 
apparent, therefore, that the expressed intent of Congress 
plays a critical role in the resolution of that issue with 
respect to funds provided by Congress to local school dis-
tricts under any federal legislation, including special 
revenue sharing for education. 
The special revenue sharing for education proposal 
currently before the United States Congress, the Better 
Schools Act of 1973, as well as the initial revenue shar-
ing for education proposal introduced in 1971, follows 
the pattern of the congressional township fund, the 
national forest reserve, and the federal flood control 
legislation concerning the intended use of the funds pro-
vided. While the latter three measures were concerned 
with maintaining, supporting, and benefiting schools, the 
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revenue sharing measures have been designed to assist, en-
courage, and assure program~. These differences appear to 
be differences of degree, the programs being merely facets 
of the schools' operations. 
A contrast must be made, however, between the revenue 
sharing proposals and the_ impact areas aid legislation. 
In the former it is educational programs which are the 
object of the congressional largess, while in the latter 
specific agencies conducting such schools and programs 
are the beneficiaries of the aid. This difference is a 
difference in kind. In the revenue sharing proposals Con-
gress has not specifically indicated which level of edu-
cational authority, the state or the local school district, 
is to have the final authority concerning the use of the 
revenue sharing funds. While some such funds would be 
"passed-through" to local educational agencies, the states 
are to be the payees of the funds. Even if by a broad 
interpretation the local school districts could be con-
sidered the payees of the funds passed-through to them, 
the congressional township fund cases demonstrate that 
such a designation of the payee is of less significance 
than the declaration of congressional intent. 
Where Congress has designated broad educational pro-
grams (i.e., schools and public schools) ~s the object of 
the federal bounty, courts have permitted states to reduce 
their aid to local educational agencies as a consequence 
of those agencies receiving the federal funds in question. 
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Whe~~, on the other hahd, Congress ~as·designated. local 
authorities charged with the responsibility q.f carrying 
on educational programs as the objects of the federal aid, 
courts have not permitted states to reduce their aid to 
local educational agencies as a consequence of those agen-
cies receiving the federal funds fn question. Since the 
special revenue sharing for education proposals presented 
to date have .sought to provide aid to programs (e.g., en-
couraging innovation and development of new educational 
programs and practices), but have been silent as to the 
agency which is to have the authority to make the deci-
sions concerning such programs, it can be concluded that, 
should special revenue sharing for education be enacted 
in its currently proposed form, states would be permitted 
to reduce state aid to their local educational agencies 
as a consequence of those agencies receiving the federal 
revenue sharing funds. 
In 1968 Congress amended the impact areas aid legis-
lation to prohibit such payments being made to any local 
educational agency in any state which takes into consid-
eration such payments in determining the eligibility of 
any local educational agency in that state for state aid, 
or the amount of state aid. Thus, Congress enacted into 
statutory law the results which two federal district 
courts had reached independently of the amendment's lan-
guage. (If the federal payments are prohibited if the 
state reduces its aid to local educational agencies 
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pecause of them, there will be no such payments for the 
state to consider in reducing its aid. Thus, there can be 
no reduction of state aid because of such payments.) The 
revenue sharing for education proposals introduced in Con-
gress thus far have not included such prohibitory language. 
Thus, courts considering the issue of whether a state may 
reduce its aid to local educational agencies as a conse-
quence of those agencies receiving federal revenue sharing 
funds would be thrust back to a consideration of the de-
claration of congressional intent, and, under the three 
lines of decisions discussed in this study, probably an-
swer the question in the affirmative. 
The contradictory implications of the 1968 amendment 
to the impact areas aid legislation and the special reve-
nue sharing for education proposals heretofote introduced 
in Congress leave room for speculation concerning the· 
true intent of Congress. Additional questions can be 
raised in light of the 1973 amendment to the impact areas 
aid legislation, eliminating the application of the 
1968. amendment to states where a post-June 30, 1972, at-
- tempt has been made to equalize expenditures for education 
among local educational agencies of the state. If Con-
gress enacts special revenue sharing for education, and if 
Congress intends that states not take into consideration 
funds required to be passed-through to local educational 
agencies in determining the eligibility of any local edu-
cational agency in that state for state aid, or the amount 
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of such aid, the proposal currently before the Congress, 
the Better Schools Act of 1973, will have to amended to 
effectuate the real ~ongressiorial intent. An amendment 
similar to the 1968 impact areas aid amendment would serve 
the congressional purpose, and could be added as subsec-
tion 5 (d) of the Act: 
No payments may be made during any fiscal 
year to any state which has taken into consid-
eration payments required to be paid by such 
state to its local educational agencies pur-
suant to subsections (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion in determining the eligibility of any 
such local educational agency in that state 
for state aid, or the amount of that aid, with 
respect to free public education during that 
year or the preceding fiscal year, or which 
makes such aid available to local educational 
agencies in such a manner as to result in less 
aid to any local educational agency which is 
eligible for funds required to be paid by such 
state pursuant to subsections (a) or (b) of 
this section than such local educational agency 
would,receive if it were not so eligible. 
If, however, it is the true intent of Congress that states 
be permitted to reduce state aid to local educational 
agencies as a consequence of those agencies receiving fed-
eral revenue sharing funds, no amendment to the Better 
Schools Act of 1973 is needed. The language of the pro-
posed declaration of congressional intent would, under the 
authority of the cases analyzed in this study, permit such 
a reduction. 
Under the authority of the cases cited in this study, 
the declaration of congressional intent contained in any 
special revenue sharing for education legislation ulti-
mately enacted by Congress will be of critical importance 
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to state and local education officials and everyone inter-
ested in the area of public school finance. Under this 
authority, there would be no protection afforded local 
school districts against a reduction in state aid funds 
as a consequence of receiving federal revenue sharing 
funds should either of the two revenue sharing for edu-
cation bills introduced in Congress to this date be en-
acted without amendment. 
' '. 
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